New Jersey Criminal Defense Attorney Blog

Howell Arrests and Traffic Tickets

Howell Township police are very active in issuing traffic tickets, DWI and criminal charges in the Township. The New Jersey State Police have jurisdiction over the stretch of I-195 that runs through Howell Township. If you have been arrested in Howell or issued a traffic ticket, call to speak with a local defense lawyer.

A lot of DWI - NJSA 39:4-50 - arrests are made in Howell Township. The majority of these occur on Route 9 and 33. Traffic tickets for speeding NJSA 39:4-98 and suspended license NJSA 39:3-40. My office also handles Howell Expungements and gun permit appeals.

Police in Howell regularly make criminal arrests for a wide variety of charges. Most of these are drug charges in Howell, especially possession of marijuana and other CDS. Arrests for harassment, assault and other disorderly persons offenses are common as well.

Howell Municipal Court

The Howell Township Municipal Court has jurisdiction over all motor vehicle and disorderly persons offenses in the town. Any Howell juvenile case or felony charge will be sent to the Monmouth County Superior Court.

The Howell Court is located at 300 Old Tavern Road, Howell, NJ 07731. The Court Administrator can be reached at (732) 938-4848. The prosecutor in Howell Court is Sean T. Kean, Esq. The judge is the Hon. Allan Kaplan, J.M.C.

Howell Township, New Jersey

Howell Township was formed from territory taken from Shrewsbury Township in 1801. At that time it included, in addition to its present area, all of what now are the Townships of Wall, Lakewood and Brick as well as all the boroughs along the Atlantic Ocean, from Barnegat Inlet of the Shark River Inlet at Belmar. Portions of Howell were taken to form Farmingdale in 1903. The community was named after Governor Richard Howell.

The total area of the township is 61.0 square miles, of which practically all is land, with only 0.15% water. As of the 2000 Census, the township of Howell was 48,903 people in 16,063 households.

The major ancestry groups reported by Howell residents include 24% Italian, 19% Irish, 13% German and 8% Polish. At present, the most common places of birth of foreign-born residents are: India (11%), Canada (8%), Iran (6%).and Mexico (6%). At the time of the last census, the racial makeup of the township was 89.99% White, Hispanic or Latino of any race 5.34%, African American 3.56% and Asian 3.58%

The median household income has been increasing steadily since 1999, when it was $59,858; by the time of the 2000 census it was $68,069 and estimates for 2008 place it at $76,391. The estimated median house or condo value in 2000 was $130,300, which more than doubled by 2008 when it reached $281,367
The median age of this township's population according to the U.S. Census Bureau was 36 years as of the last census.

The highest percentages of this figure correspond to people between 25 and 44 years old (32.8%) and those under the age of 18 (30.9%). The smallest percentage (1.6%) belongs to people age 45 to 64.

The principal industries in which males engage are: Construction (22%), Machinery (18%), Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting (17%) and Electrical and electronic goods merchant wholesalers (10%). Females are mostly found in the following industries: Finance and insurance (21%), Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting (12%) and Computer and electronic products (12%).

The above statistics are reflected in the occupations to which males of this township are dedicated: Metal workers and plastic workers (18%), Farmers and farm managers (10%), Sales representatives, services, wholesale and manufacturing (10%) and Driver/sales workers and truck drivers (10%). Female inhabitants of Howell work mostly in the following occupations: Child care workers (16%), other management occupations except farmers and farm managers (12%) and other financial specialists (11%).

In 2003, the FBI reported 68 violent crimes in Howell without murders or homicides. The violent crime rate was 1.4 per 1,000 people.

According to the 2000 census data, the educational attainment of the school population 25 and older is distributed quite evenly between high school graduates (30.0%), those with some college or associate0s degree (29.3%) and with a bachelor's degree (20.2%). These percentages are comparable with state and national ones. Only the percentage of individuals with master's, professional or doctorate degree falls below the state level (8.7% vs. 11.0%).

Long Branch police make a ton of drug possession arrests. In addition to the Long Branch Police, the New Jersey State Police and even the FBI are active in the city. Call any time to speak with a Long Branch drug arrest lawyer.

Long Branch has undergone something of a renaissance in the last ten years. However, the addition of Pier Village and exclusive apartments lining the coast have not brought a decline in drug arrests in Long Branch. Most drug arrests in Long Branch are for marijuana possession, cocaine and prescription pills. Arrests for ecstasy and heroin are also made on a regular basis.

Long Branch CDS charges usually occur after either a traffic stop or a street encounter. If police have reasonable suspicion to stop your car for a traffic ticket, they do not automatically have the right to search you or your vehicle. However, police may ask you to step out of the vehicle and pat you down to check for weapons.

While checking for weapons, the officer may feel what he or she immediately knows to be drugs. While it is difficult to believe that many of these searches are valid, they often survive a suppression motion. A suppression motion is the legal filing that enables you to challenge a police search of your home, car, or person.

Street encounters with police are also common in Long Branch. Most of these occur off Broadway and in the Pier Village area. Garfield Park has also seen a ton of drug activity and arrests in the past. If a police officer approaches a suspect on the street, the suspect does not have to answer any questions. Case law suggests that even if the suspect takes off running, police do not generally have the right to arrest and search the person without probable cause.

If you are charged with possession of marijuana or drug paraphernalia in Long Branch, your case will be sent to the Long Branch Municipal Court. The Long Branch Municipal Court is located at 279 Broadway # 1, Long Branch, NJ 07740-6961. The phone number is (732) 571-6500. If you are charged with possession of less than 50 grams of marijuana or drug paraphernalia, you will likely be processed at the Long Branch Police station and released with a complaint and court date. You have the right to remain silent during your processing and should not make any incriminating statements.

Possession of Marijuana and drug paraphernalia in Long Branch are disorderly persons offenses. A disorderly persons offense in New Jersey carries up to 6 months in jail and a $1,000 fine. For possession of marijuana in an amount less than 50 grams, you must also pay a $500 DEDR penalty, $75 SS and $50 VCCB penalty, and $33 court costs.

Your summons or complaint the police give you will have a court date entered. This hearing will be your arraignment. At your arraignment, the judge will read the charges to you and advise you of your rights. You have the right to remain silent at your arraignment and should not make any statements other than "not-guilty." Better yet, simply hire a Long Branch criminal defense attorney and let us do the talking.

If we are retained before your arraignment we can usually have your first appearance waived. Hiring an attorney is the first step in fighting your Long Branch CDS charge. We will contact the Long Branch court, enter a not-guilty plea for you, waive your arraignment, demand all discovery (evidence) and a speedy trial.

We will review the evidence with you and see if there may be a way to attack the search. The evidence will usually include the arrest report, incident report, video, and the results of the lab testing of any drugs that were found. The lab report usually takes at least a month to be delivered to us from the police. Local police departments in New Jersey do not conduct laboratory testing. Suspected CDS is sent to a State Police lab for analysis. The Sea Girt lab services the Long Branch Police Department.

If you have been charged with a CDS offense or were arrested in Long Branch, we can help. Call now to speak with a New Jersey drug charge lawyer.

Can police in New Jersey enter your home or search your house without a warrant. This is a common question. Unfortunately, the answer is: it depends. In many criminal defense cases in NJ, police end up at a suspects house looking for evidence or the suspect himself. Usually the police are looking for drugs, CDS, weapons or other evidence. Luckily, New Jersey places a high standard on home entries and searches.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution prohibit "unreasonable searches and seizures" by government officials, and our constitutional jurisprudence expresses a preference that those officials secure warrants issued by neutral and detached magistrates before executing a search, particularly of a home. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369, 92 L. Ed. 436, 440 (1948); State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 210 (2001); State v. Kasabucki, 52 N.J. 110, 115-16, (1968); State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 586, 597-98 (2004).
A warrantless search is presumed invalid. State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 19 (2004). The burden is placed on the State to prove that the search "'falls within one of the few well delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 482 (2001).
"An individual's privacy interests are nowhere more clearly defined or rigorously protected by the courts than in the home, the core of Fourth Amendment rights." Johnson, supra, 168 N.J. 608, 625 (2001). Therefore, "[a] warrantless search of a person's home 'must be subjected to particularly careful scrutiny.'" State v. Cassidy, 179 N.J. 150, 160 (2004) (quoting State v. Bolte, 115 N.J. 579, 583, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 936, 110 S. Ct. 330, 107 L. Ed. 2d 320 (1989)).
The New Jersey Supreme Court set out the heavy burden that the State bears when justifying a warrantless entry and search of a home by stating:

[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed. Accordingly, it is well established that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable, and hence prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances.

[State v. Hutchins, 116 N.J. 457, 463 (1989)(citations and quotation marks omitted).]

A homeowner has a right under our federal and state constitutions to insist that a police officer obtain a warrant before entering and searching his house. See State v. Bolte, supra, 115 N.J. at 583-84; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2043-44, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 858 (1973). The assertion of that constitutional right, which protects the most basic privacy interests of our citizenry, is not probative of wrongdoing and cannot be the justification for the warrantless entry into a home. Ibid.
The community caretaking exception was recently expanded to certain searches of the home. State v. Witczak, 2011 N.J. Super. LEXIS 62 (App. Div. 2011).
The community caretaker exception asks whether the police are "engaged in 'functions, [which are] totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a statute.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Navarro, 310 N.J. Super. 104, 109, 708 A.2d 416 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 382 (1998). The emergency aid exception focuses on "'(1) the existence of an emergency as viewed objectively, (2) a search not motivated by a desire to find evidence and (3) a nexus between the search and the emergency.'" Id. at 161,
Another predominant exception to the warrant requirement is for exigent circumstances. Cassidy, supra, 179 N.J. at 160. Under this exception, "circumstances have been found to be exigent when they 'preclude expenditure of the time necessary to obtain a warrant because of a probability that the suspect or the object of the search will disappear, or both.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Smith, 129 N.J. Super. 430, 435 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 66 N.J. 327 (1974)).
A court must perform a fact-sensitive analysis that includes:
"[t]he degree of urgency and the amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant; the reasonable belief that the evidence was about to be lost, destroyed, or removed from the scene; the severity or seriousness of the offense involved; the possibility that a suspect is armed or dangerous; and the strength or weakness of the underlying probable cause determination."

[Cassidy, supra, 179 N.J. at 160-61].

If the police had sufficient time to obtain a warrant, and the alleged exigent circumstances were "police created," the evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless entry must be suppressed. See State v. Hutchins, 116 N.J. 457, 468-77 (1989). "Police created exigent circumstances which arise from unreasonable investigative conduct cannot justify warrantless home entries." State v. De La Paz, 337 N.J. Super. 181, 196 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 168 N.J. 295 (2001).
In determining whether a warrantless entry into a residence was justified or was the product of a police-created exigency, a court should "appraise the [officer's] conduct during the entire period after they had a right to obtain a warrant and not merely from the moment when they knocked at the front door." United States v. Patino, 830 F.2d 1413, 1416 (7th Cir. 1987). A court's "first concern in analyzing a claim of manufactured exigency is whether [the officers] could have obtained a search warrant prior to the development of the exigent circumstances upon which they relied." Hutchins, supra, 116 N.J. at 470.
"Plain view" is sometimes used to describe situations in which items are exposed to public view in a public place or in an otherwise constitutionally unprotected location; their observation and seizure are authorized without a warrant. See, e.g., State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35 (1968).
When objects come into "plain view" only after and as a result of an unlawful intrusion into a constitutionally protected zone, evidence of such observation and any warrantless seizure resulting must be suppressed. State v. O'Herron, 153 N.J. Super. 570, 574-575 (App. Div. 1977); see also See State v. Rice, 115 N.J. Super. 128 (App. Div. 1971); State v. Baker, 112 N.J. Super. 351 (App. Div. 1970).

Princeton Police make a significant amount of arrests for possession of marijuana, drugs, drug paraphernalia and other controlled dangerous substance (CDS) possession. This is partly because of Princeton Townships roads and highways. Routes 27, 1 and 206 all traverse the Township. These roads bring in tons of traffic tickets, which often lead to searches and seizures of drugs.

Princeton Township is located in eastern Mercer County, New Jersey. Princeton Township has its own municipal court. Princeton Borough also has a Municipal Court, leading to confusion as to where one has to go for their court appearance. These New Jersey Municipal Courts have jurisdiction over traffic tickets, DWI, DUI, Drunk Driving, and criminal matters such as harassment, assault, and drug charges.

After stopping a car over for a traffic violation such as speeding, tailgating, or passing a school bus, police will obviously approach the driver and ask for his or her credentials. Princeton police are well-trained to smell both raw and burnt marijuana. If, during a lawful stop, police smell the odor or marijuana, they may ask the driver for consent to search the vehicle. If the police see drugs, weapons, or contraband in plain view, this may also cause them to search the vehicle.

These searches can be challenged by an experienced criminal defense attorney. Before appearing in Princeton court by yourself, you should find out what your rights are and what penalties you may be facing. Being convicted of a drug offense in New Jersey carries serious consequences such as jail, probation, fines, driver's license suspension and a criminal record.

State v. Brian Wilk, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-0628-09T4 (October 20, 2010) - Conviction reversed, suppression ordered. "The first two prongs of the automobile exception are present. Garcia stopped defendant unexpectedly and he had probable cause to believe that defendant's car contained contraband. Garcia had a well-grounded suspicion that heroin was in the car because defendant produced a torn cigarette filter.... We conclude, however, that the third prong was not met because exigent circumstances that precluded obtaining a warrant were not present. Neither the officers' safety nor the preservation of evidence were in jeopardy, and it was not impractical to obtain a warrant prior to searching defendant's car.... Garcia stopped defendant's car on Friday afternoon around 12:15 p.m. Defendant was the sole occupant; the surrounding area was part business and residential; the stop was not in a high crime area; traffic was light and not obstructed by defendant's car; back-up arrived immediately; defendant cooperated; and he was not arrested until after the search.... Moreover, police had control of the car and never left it unguarded. Katsigiannis remained with the car when Garcia took defendant to police headquarters because the car had been impounded. Impounding the car obviated any concern for the destruction of any potential evidence. Any delay in obtaining a search warrant would not have placed the officers' safety in jeopardy or compromised the integrity of the evidence."

State v. Calvin Johnson, Jr., unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-1567-09T1 (October 26, 2010) - Suppression of evidence affirmed.

Continue reading "NJ Police Search of Parked Car Deemed Illegal " »

State v. Ender F. Pompa, ? N.J. Super. ?, 2010 N.J. Super. LEXIS 114 (July 2, 2010) - Conviction reversed, case remanded for suppression of evidence and new trial. "Defendant was convicted of various drug offenses after more than thirty pounds of marijuana were seized from the sleeper cabin of his tractor trailer.... [T]he closely regulated business exception permitted a warrantless administrative inspection of certain areas of the tractor trailer, but the search turned unlawful when it progressed into unregulated areas without the exigent circumstances required by State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6, 28 (2009).... [T]he Trooper was entitled to conduct an administrative inspection of defendant's vehicle pursuant to applicable regulations and the purposes for which those regulations were adopted.... [T]he Level II inspection was permitted and authorized entry into the sleeper cabin since the federal regulations extend that far. However, the regulations do not encompass closets or personal belongings located inside a sleeper cabin and, as a result, the closely regulated business exception cannot form the basis for a warrantless search into those areas. Even if we assume Trooper Budrewicz entered the sleeper cabin for the purpose of conducting a safety check, ... , the search inside the cabin's closet and the opening of the baggage within that closet exceeded the letter and intent of the regulations applicable to sleeper cabins. In short, the search of the cabin's closet exceeded 'the spatial scope' of the administrative inspection.... In deferring to the trial judge's finding that the Trooper was able to smell raw marijuana in the sleeper cabin, we agree probable cause existed to search further into the sleeper cabin. However, in applying the requirements of Pena-Flores, mere proof of an unexpected vehicle stop and probable cause did not permit a warrantless search beyond the limits of the administrative inspection in the absence of exigent circumstances. As a result, the evidence seized from the closet in the vehicle's cabin and the additional evidence seized without a warrant thereafter could not be lawfully used against defendant at trial."

In this recent criminal appeal, the NJ Supreme Court set a bright-line rule on when so-called "protective sweeps" are justified.

State v. Johnnie Davila, ? N.J. ?, 2010 N.J. LEXIS 590 (July 14, 2010) - Denial of suppression reversed, case remanded for further proceedings on propriety of protective sweep. "[A]lthough we hold that the absence of probable cause to arrest does not render a protective sweep per se illegal, we acknowledge that it would be too facile to permit a protective sweep whenever officers are lawfully within a premises. There is simply too great a potential for the pretextual use of otherwise lawful police presence as an opportunity to conduct a warrantless raid of a home cloaked as a protective sweep; so broad an exception would swallow whole the protections of the warrant requirement. Those concerns are particularly relevant where, as in this case, the lawfulness of the police entry is based on the consent of an occupant.... We hold that a protective sweep of a home may only occur when (1) law enforcement officers are lawfully within the private premises for a legitimate purpose, which may include consent to enter; and (2) the officers on the scene have a reasonable articulable suspicion that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger. Where those substantive conditions are met, as a matter of procedure, the sweep will be upheld only if (1) it is cursory, and (2) it is limited in scope to locations in which an individual could be concealed.... The search should be strictly limited in duration to the time frame during which police are lawfully within the premises.... The law enforcement officers cannot have created the danger to which they became exposed by entering the premises, and thereby bootstrap into an entitlement to perform a protective sweep.... In the present matter, ..., we are satisfied that there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that the officers entered the apartment due to the consent of Jayaad Brown. However, questions remain concerning the legitimacy of the investigative technique employed. On remand we direct the trial court to consider specifically whether the knock-and-talk technique employed by the officers was a pretext to gain access to the apartment to conduct an unconstitutional search, and not to speak to the occupants. We have serious reservations arising from our disagreement with the court's observation that the officers possessed articulable suspicion to justify the search of the apartment...."

State v. Tyson R. Privott, ? N.J. ?, 2010 N.J. LEXIS ? (June 29, 2010) - Appellate Division opinion suppressing evidence affirmed.

Continue reading "Jersey Police Officer's Search Exceeded Scope of Investigatory Stop" »

State v. Pablo Carvajal, ? N.J. ?, 2010 N.J. LEXIS ? (June 2, 2010) - Conviction and denial of suppression affirmed.

Continue reading "New Jersey Defendant Has No Standing to Challenge Search of Abandoned Property" »

State v. Danny Mai, ? N.J. ?, 2010 N.J. LEXIS 393 (May 6, 2010) - Appellate Division judgment reversed, conviction reinstated. "Responding to an early morning hours radio call of a 'man with a gun,' police officers approached a double-parked van containing five occupants; the van also was surrounded by a half-dozen young men.

Based on that obvious traffic violation, the police detained the van. Fearing for his and his fellow officers' safety, one of the police officers opened the van's passenger-side sliding side door as a protective measure before actually ordering the passengers to exit the van. In so doing, van was consistent with the description of a 'man-with-a-gun' earlier broadcast over the radio. That passenger was told to step out of the van and, as he did as instructed, another police officer observed a firearm on the floor of the van where the passenger was seated.

A loaded weapon was retrieved and the passenger was arrested; a search of the passenger revealed a gun holster and a second loaded ammunition magazine fitting the retrieved weapon.... The standard for determining whether, in the context of a traffic violation, a police officer may order that a passenger alight from a vehicle previously was set forth in State v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599 (1994)[i.e., that] 'that an officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts that would warrant heightened caution to justify ordering the occupants to step out of a vehicle detained for a traffic violation.'... In the realm of defining reasonable searches and seizures, no meaningful or relevant difference exists between the grant of authority to order an occupant of a vehicle to exit the vehicle and the authority to open the door as part of issuing that lawful order.

Plain logic demands that the principles that govern whether a passenger of a vehicle lawfully can be ordered out of the vehicle must apply with equal force to whether a police officer is entitled, as a corollary and reasonable safety measure, to open the door as part of issuing a proper order to exit.... We therefore hold that, in the aggregate, there was sufficient credible evidence presented in the suppression hearing to conclude that the 'facts in the totality of the circumstances ... create[d] in a police officer a heightened awareness of danger that ... warrant[ed] an objectively reasonable officer in securing the scene in a more effective manner by ordering the passenger to alight from the car.' Smith, supra, 134 N.J. at 618. Those facts likewise justified the objectively reasonable belief that, as a precautionary measure, the door to the vehicle needed to be opened by the police. In those circumstances, both opening the door and ordering the passengers out of the vehicle were proper and lawful."

State v. Riley K. Jefferson, ? N.J. Super. ?, 2010 N.J. Super. LEXIS 87 (May 21, 2010) - Denial of suppression motion affirmed in part, reversed in part. "The trial court began its decision by concluding that the citizen informant provided a reliable tip, and that the tip established a reasonable basis for the police to investigate the vehicle identified and defendant, who fit the description provided and, minutes later, was at the address where the police found the vehicle. We agree with these conclusions....

We hold, however, that the police entered defendant's home when Sergeant Smith wedged herself in the doorway, and that they needed either a warrant or an exception from the warrant requirement of the federal and State constitutions to do so.... We disagree with the trial court's conclusion that Sergeant Smith acted reasonably, meaning constitutionally, when she wedged herself in the front doorway to prevent defendant from closing it. The trial court found that the common hallway of the multi-family house was not open to the public, and the police were not privileged to enter that hallway. Contrary to the trial court's implicit conclusion, reasonable suspicion to detain and question defendant pursuant to Terry, if the police had encountered him in a place where they had a right to be, did not authorize the police to enter his home for that purpose in the absence of consent or exigent circumstances....

[D]efendant's possible willingness to speak to the police from inside his house did not translate into permission for them to enter. Defendant gave no indication that he had invited the police into the hallway, or into any part of his home. We reject the State's argument that Sergeant Smith could reasonably believe that she was permitted to 'move to the threshold to view [defendant's] entire body and ascertain that defendant was not armed.' In fact, she inserted herself into the doorway while defendant was peering from behind it, thus expressing his choice to exclude the police from his home....

In this case, the police had no warrant and made no showing of an exception from the warrant requirement when Sergeant Smith partially entered defendant's residence to stop him from closing his front door. That conduct of the police infringed upon the 'firm line at the entrance to the house' when applying the protections of the Fourth Amendment. [Citations omitted]."

State v. Steven Bloom, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-0076-09T4 (May 28, 2010) - Order suppressing evidence affirmed. "In this case, the State first argues that no search of defendant's premises was intended, and that the police were present there as lawful social guests or business invitees.... [I]n the present case, the judge accepted as credible defendant's testimony that, although Nugnes's conduct may have appeared to be merely investigatory, the other two officers pushed past defendant in an obvious attempt to view the entire first floor of the condominium unit.

Thus, the evidence as supported by the record and accepted by the motion judge establishes that the police sought to do more than enter to continue their investigation [and] the State was required to demonstrate that an exception to the warrant requirement validated their warrantless search of defendant's dwelling....

Even if we assume that defendant invited or permitted the police to enter into the hall of his condominium, we find no legal justification for their further intrusion into the living portion of the unit -- an area for which the judge found consent to enter was not provided. Such an intrusion was not required in order for the police to complete their announced mission of investigating a noise complaint, and it could not have been reasonably contemplated by defendant when he allegedly permitted entry into the hall....

The difficulty with [the State's arguments regarding plain view of various items including hypodermic needles and a Glock pistol] is [that they are] premised on the presumption that the police's presence in defendant's living room was legal. The motion judge found that it was not, and we find that conclusion to be factually and legally supported. Moreover, the State's view requires acceptance of the State's position that defendant led the police into his living room and complied with Nugnes's request that he seat himself on the couch. Defendant denied that this version of events was correct, and the trial judge credited defendant's testimony."

State v. Darius S. Mansoory, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-5735-08T4 (March 17, 2010) - Suppression of evidence affirmed. Although it was proper for the police to impound the car (defendant driver intoxicated, passenger had no license) and open the wallet found during an inventory of the car's contents, "when the officer unfolded the papers found within the wallet, the officer exceeded the permissible scope of the inventory.

The papers did not appear to be valuable. Furthermore, Spahr testified that he unfolded the papers because he suspected that they contained illegal drugs or drug paraphernalia. Therefore, the search of the contents of the papers found in the wallet was not undertaken for one of the purposes identified in [South Dakota v. ]Opperman[, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)].... The search at issue here was not undertaken pursuant to a policy designed to prevent or deter a terrorist attack upon a ferry. As we have explained, the search was in furtherance of the DRPA's policy to inventory the contents of an impounded vehicle."

Millstone Township Municipal Court

Location: 215 Millstone Road
Millstone Twp., NJ 08510

Phone: (732) 446-6219
Fax: (732) 446-4853

The judge in Millstone Courts is the Honorable Francis F.X. Foley, J.M.C. The prosecutor is Richard Kelly, Esq. Traffic tickets, millstone marijuana arrests, and DWI charges from both Millstone Township and Roosevelt Borough are heard in this court. The Court Administrator is Diane Canzanella, CMCA. Millstone Township does not have its own police department. The New Jersey State Police have jurisdiction over the area and issue a large amount of speeding and other traffic tickets. Also a fair amount of minor drug possession arrests resulting from car searches.

Millstone - New Jersey

Millstone Township is located in the far western portion of Monmouth County, New Jersey. The township is a picturesque community of horse and tree farms. The 2000 US Census reported the township's population to be 8,970.
Millstone Township became officially incorporated by an Act of the New Jersey Legislature on February 28, 1844. The township was carved from sections of Freehold Township, Upper Freehold Township and Monroe Township. In 1845, Millstone gave Monroe Twp back the parts of the township taken from Monroe.

Millstone spans about 37.2 square miles (96.3 km2), of which, 36.8 square miles (95.2 km2) of it is land and 0.4 square miles (1.1 km2) of it (1.13%) is water.
Six Flags Great Adventure, which is located in Jackson, is nearby with an entrance from Millstone.

Millstone Township is organized under the "Township form" of New Jersey municipal government. The township committee is made up of five members elected at large in partisan elections every November. While Millstone children attend local schools, high school age public school students attend Allentown High School.

The township is well serviced by roads and highways, with CR 571, CR 524, CR 526, CR 527, CR 537 Routes 33 and I-195 all passing through Millstone.

Roosevelt Borough

Roosevelt was incorporated as a borough called Jersey Homesteads in 1937 from portions of Millstone Township. The community was renamed Roosevelt after the president's death in 1945.
In 2008, the New Jersey Monthly magazine ranked Roosevelt as the 12th "Best Place to Live" in New Jersey.

The population density low. As per the 2010 census, less than 900 people lived in Roosevelt in the total area of 2.0 square miles. The 2000 census registered 258 families, 337 households and 351 housing units. According to unofficial data, the estimated median house or condo value in 2009 was $264,684, almost twice the 2000 value of $133,600.

More than a third (39.5%) of the households had minors living with them. The majority (64.1%) were composed of married couples living together. Households made up of non-families and of individuals represented 23.4% and 18.7%, respectively. About 11% had someone living alone who was 65 years old or over.

The median age of the population of Roosevelt at the time of the 2000 census was 40 years. The age breakdown was 27.8% under 18, 26.7% from 25 to 44, 27.5% from 45 to 64, and 12.1% who 65 or older. There were 87.7 adult males for every 100 adult females.

The most common ancestries are Irish (22.4%), German (14.8%), Italian (10.1%), Polish (9.6%), English (6.5%), and French (4.9%). As of the 2000 census, the ethnic composition was 88.96% White, 4.50% Hispanic or Latino of any race, 2.57% African American, and 2.04% Asian.

The 2000 census statistics reveal that the median family income was $67,019. Male median income was about 32% higher than that of females ($50,417 versus $38,229). The median household income and the per capita income were $61,979 and $24,892, respectively. As per unofficial 2008 estimates, these stood at $85,554 and $33,138. Around 4.3% of the population lived below the poverty line. The January 2011 cost of living index was 19.1% higher than the national average.

The 2010 data for highest educational level of residents age 25 and over reveal that 5.09% did not complete high school versus 26.93% who did. Those with some college or associate's degree represented 20.96%. Holders of a bachelor's degree were 28.09% versus 20.65% statewide. Those with a graduate degree were 18.92% versus 12.05% statewide.

During the 2005-2009 period, most males were employed in the industries of information (12%), educational services (12%), construction (10%), and retail trade (10%). Approximately 40% of the females were engaged in educational services (19%), health care and social assistance (18%), and retail trade (15%)