New Jersey Criminal Defense Attorney Blog

State v. Tyson R. Privott, ? N.J. ?, 2010 N.J. LEXIS ? (June 29, 2010) - Appellate Division opinion suppressing evidence affirmed.

Continue reading "Jersey Police Officer's Search Exceeded Scope of Investigatory Stop" »

State v. Pablo Carvajal, ? N.J. ?, 2010 N.J. LEXIS ? (June 2, 2010) - Conviction and denial of suppression affirmed.

Continue reading "New Jersey Defendant Has No Standing to Challenge Search of Abandoned Property" »

State v. Danny Mai, ? N.J. ?, 2010 N.J. LEXIS 393 (May 6, 2010) - Appellate Division judgment reversed, conviction reinstated. "Responding to an early morning hours radio call of a 'man with a gun,' police officers approached a double-parked van containing five occupants; the van also was surrounded by a half-dozen young men.

Based on that obvious traffic violation, the police detained the van. Fearing for his and his fellow officers' safety, one of the police officers opened the van's passenger-side sliding side door as a protective measure before actually ordering the passengers to exit the van. In so doing, van was consistent with the description of a 'man-with-a-gun' earlier broadcast over the radio. That passenger was told to step out of the van and, as he did as instructed, another police officer observed a firearm on the floor of the van where the passenger was seated.

A loaded weapon was retrieved and the passenger was arrested; a search of the passenger revealed a gun holster and a second loaded ammunition magazine fitting the retrieved weapon.... The standard for determining whether, in the context of a traffic violation, a police officer may order that a passenger alight from a vehicle previously was set forth in State v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599 (1994)[i.e., that] 'that an officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts that would warrant heightened caution to justify ordering the occupants to step out of a vehicle detained for a traffic violation.'... In the realm of defining reasonable searches and seizures, no meaningful or relevant difference exists between the grant of authority to order an occupant of a vehicle to exit the vehicle and the authority to open the door as part of issuing that lawful order.

Plain logic demands that the principles that govern whether a passenger of a vehicle lawfully can be ordered out of the vehicle must apply with equal force to whether a police officer is entitled, as a corollary and reasonable safety measure, to open the door as part of issuing a proper order to exit.... We therefore hold that, in the aggregate, there was sufficient credible evidence presented in the suppression hearing to conclude that the 'facts in the totality of the circumstances ... create[d] in a police officer a heightened awareness of danger that ... warrant[ed] an objectively reasonable officer in securing the scene in a more effective manner by ordering the passenger to alight from the car.' Smith, supra, 134 N.J. at 618. Those facts likewise justified the objectively reasonable belief that, as a precautionary measure, the door to the vehicle needed to be opened by the police. In those circumstances, both opening the door and ordering the passengers out of the vehicle were proper and lawful."

State v. Riley K. Jefferson, ? N.J. Super. ?, 2010 N.J. Super. LEXIS 87 (May 21, 2010) - Denial of suppression motion affirmed in part, reversed in part. "The trial court began its decision by concluding that the citizen informant provided a reliable tip, and that the tip established a reasonable basis for the police to investigate the vehicle identified and defendant, who fit the description provided and, minutes later, was at the address where the police found the vehicle. We agree with these conclusions....

We hold, however, that the police entered defendant's home when Sergeant Smith wedged herself in the doorway, and that they needed either a warrant or an exception from the warrant requirement of the federal and State constitutions to do so.... We disagree with the trial court's conclusion that Sergeant Smith acted reasonably, meaning constitutionally, when she wedged herself in the front doorway to prevent defendant from closing it. The trial court found that the common hallway of the multi-family house was not open to the public, and the police were not privileged to enter that hallway. Contrary to the trial court's implicit conclusion, reasonable suspicion to detain and question defendant pursuant to Terry, if the police had encountered him in a place where they had a right to be, did not authorize the police to enter his home for that purpose in the absence of consent or exigent circumstances....

[D]efendant's possible willingness to speak to the police from inside his house did not translate into permission for them to enter. Defendant gave no indication that he had invited the police into the hallway, or into any part of his home. We reject the State's argument that Sergeant Smith could reasonably believe that she was permitted to 'move to the threshold to view [defendant's] entire body and ascertain that defendant was not armed.' In fact, she inserted herself into the doorway while defendant was peering from behind it, thus expressing his choice to exclude the police from his home....

In this case, the police had no warrant and made no showing of an exception from the warrant requirement when Sergeant Smith partially entered defendant's residence to stop him from closing his front door. That conduct of the police infringed upon the 'firm line at the entrance to the house' when applying the protections of the Fourth Amendment. [Citations omitted]."

State v. Steven Bloom, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-0076-09T4 (May 28, 2010) - Order suppressing evidence affirmed. "In this case, the State first argues that no search of defendant's premises was intended, and that the police were present there as lawful social guests or business invitees.... [I]n the present case, the judge accepted as credible defendant's testimony that, although Nugnes's conduct may have appeared to be merely investigatory, the other two officers pushed past defendant in an obvious attempt to view the entire first floor of the condominium unit.

Thus, the evidence as supported by the record and accepted by the motion judge establishes that the police sought to do more than enter to continue their investigation [and] the State was required to demonstrate that an exception to the warrant requirement validated their warrantless search of defendant's dwelling....

Even if we assume that defendant invited or permitted the police to enter into the hall of his condominium, we find no legal justification for their further intrusion into the living portion of the unit -- an area for which the judge found consent to enter was not provided. Such an intrusion was not required in order for the police to complete their announced mission of investigating a noise complaint, and it could not have been reasonably contemplated by defendant when he allegedly permitted entry into the hall....

The difficulty with [the State's arguments regarding plain view of various items including hypodermic needles and a Glock pistol] is [that they are] premised on the presumption that the police's presence in defendant's living room was legal. The motion judge found that it was not, and we find that conclusion to be factually and legally supported. Moreover, the State's view requires acceptance of the State's position that defendant led the police into his living room and complied with Nugnes's request that he seat himself on the couch. Defendant denied that this version of events was correct, and the trial judge credited defendant's testimony."

State v. Darius S. Mansoory, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-5735-08T4 (March 17, 2010) - Suppression of evidence affirmed. Although it was proper for the police to impound the car (defendant driver intoxicated, passenger had no license) and open the wallet found during an inventory of the car's contents, "when the officer unfolded the papers found within the wallet, the officer exceeded the permissible scope of the inventory.

The papers did not appear to be valuable. Furthermore, Spahr testified that he unfolded the papers because he suspected that they contained illegal drugs or drug paraphernalia. Therefore, the search of the contents of the papers found in the wallet was not undertaken for one of the purposes identified in [South Dakota v. ]Opperman[, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)].... The search at issue here was not undertaken pursuant to a policy designed to prevent or deter a terrorist attack upon a ferry. As we have explained, the search was in furtherance of the DRPA's policy to inventory the contents of an impounded vehicle."

Millstone Township Municipal Court

Location: 215 Millstone Road
Millstone Twp., NJ 08510

Phone: (732) 446-6219
Fax: (732) 446-4853

The judge in Millstone Courts is the Honorable Francis F.X. Foley, J.M.C. The prosecutor is Richard Kelly, Esq. The Court Administrator is Diane Canzanella, CMCA. Millstone Township does not have its own police department. The New Jersey State Police have jurisdiction over the area and issue a large amount of speeding and other traffic tickets. Also a fair amount of minor drug possession arrests resulting from car searches.

Millstone Township is located in the far western portion of Monmouth County, New Jersey. The township is a picturesque community of horse and tree farms. The 2000 US Census reported the township's population to be 8,970.
Millstone Township became officially incorporated by an Act of the New Jersey Legislature on February 28, 1844. The township was carved from sections of Freehold Township, Upper Freehold Township and Monroe Township. In 1845, Millstone gave Monroe Twp back the parts of the township taken from Monroe.

Millstone spans about 37.2 square miles (96.3 km2), of which, 36.8 square miles (95.2 km2) of it is land and 0.4 square miles (1.1 km2) of it (1.13%) is water.
Six Flags Great Adventure, which is located in Jackson, is nearby with an entrance from Millstone.

Millstone Township is organized under the "Township form" of New Jersey municipal government. The township committee is made up of five members elected at large in partisan elections every November. While Millstone children attend local schools, high school age public school students attend Allentown High School.

The township is well serviced by roads and highways, with CR 571, CR 524, CR 526, CR 527, CR 537 Routes 33 and I-195 all passing through Millstone.

In this recent NJ Criminal Appeal, the defense attorney successfully argued that a police search of a vehicle's glove box was illegal.

State v. Ricardo Manuel Ortiz and Arnaldo A. Ortiz, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-4026-08T4 (December 28, 2009) - Suppression of evidence affirmed. Although the stop of the vehicle for having too-darkly tinted windows was justified, and the smell of unburned marijuana gave the police "a well-grounded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot," "we conclude that sufficient credible evidence in the record supports the motion judge's finding that the police lacked exigency to search the glove compartment without first obtaining a warrant, either by telephone or in person....

[A]t all times, the occupants of the SUV complied with police directions, including moving their vehicle some distance from the scene. There was no indication they knew Arnaldo's vehicle contained CDS, nor was any CDS in plain view. Far from presenting any threat to the officers' safety or preservation of the evidence, one of the SUV occupants, a relative of defendants, was actually given the keys to Arnaldo's Honda to take possession of the vehicle upon the defendants' transport to jail....

Equally lacking is any indication that any delay occasioned by obtaining a warrant to search the car would have jeopardized either the officers' safety or the integrity of the evidence.... Koeppen, upon opening the glove compartment and observing the bag, did not believe the bag contained a weapon of any kind. Even if Koeppen lawfully opened the glove compartment, there would have been no justification under the State's theory for further searching the plastic bag, which did not appear on its exterior to contain any weapon therein....

Here, to avoid suppression as fruit of the poisonous automobile search, the State had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the cocaine in Ricardo's shoe and sock would have inevitably been discovered as a result of a search incident to a lawful warrant or an inventory search prefatory to his incarceration on that charge. Yet the State has offered no evidence -- much less clear and convincing proof -- of the circumstances attending Ricardo's stationhouse search....

Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that Ricardo would have been lawfully confined to a municipal or county detention facility, that he would not otherwise have been released on his own recognizance, or have posted bail if, in fact, bail had been set on the warrant charge. To the contrary, the record is silent even as to the underlying charge on which Ricardo's outstanding warrant was based." (Marc E. Lieberman)
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a4026-08.pdf

Mercer County Superior Court
Mailing Address:
PO Box 8068
Trenton, NJ 08608
Street Address:
209 S Broad Street
Trenton, NJ 08608

East Windsor Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
80 One Mile Road, East
Windsor, NJ 08520
Phone Number: (609) 448-3228

Ewing Township Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
2 Jake Garzio Drive
Ewing, NJ
Phone Number: (609) 883-2900

Hamilton Township
Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
1270 Whitehorse Ave Cn00150
Hamilton, NJ
Phone Number: (609) 581-4071

Hightstown Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
148 N Main Street
Hightstown, NJ
Phone Number: (609) 490-5105

Hopewell Borough Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
PO Box 343
Hopewell, NJ
Phone Number: (609) 466-0968

Hopewell Township Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
201 Washington Crossing
Pennington Road Titusville, NJ
Phone Number: (609) 737-1035

Lawrence Township Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
Municipal Square P.O. Box 6006 Lawrenceville, NJ
Phone Number: (609) 844-7159

Pennington Borough Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
30 North Main Street
Pennington, NJ
Phone Number: (609) 737-1016

Princeton Borough Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
PO Box 390 1 Monument Dr
Princeton, NJ
Phone Number: (609) 497-7600

Princeton Township Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
400 Witherspoon St.
Princeton Township, NJ
Phone Number: (609) 924-5042

Trenton Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
225 N Clinton Ave
PO Box 1360 Trenton, NJ
Phone Number: (609) 989-3700

Washington Township Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
1117 Route 130
Robbinsville, NJ
Phone Number: (609) 259-7085

West Windsor Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
20 Municipal Drive PO Box 38 Princeton Junction, NJ
Phone Number: (609) 799-0915

In this NJ criminal defense appeal victory, the defense attorney successfully argued that flight from an unconstitutional stop does not automatically justify the admission of evidence obtained during a subsequent search at trial. Summary by Mark Friedman.

State v. Robert E. Williams, ? N.J. Super. ?, 2009 N.J. Super. LEXIS ? (November 23, 2009) - Conviction reversed, suppression ordered. "The primary issue presented by this appeal is whether flight from an unconstitutional investigatory stop that could justify an arrest for obstruction automatically justifies the admission of any evidence revealed during the course of that flight.

We conclude that such evidence is admissible only if there is a significant attenuation between the unconstitutional stop and the seizure of evidence and that commission of the offense of obstruction is insufficient by itself to establish significant attenuation....

[T]he trial court correctly concluded that Officer Delaprida and his partner did not have a reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged or about to engage in criminal activity. These police officers had been dispatched to the housing complex based on a report of a possible retaliatory shooting in the area....

[T]he officers admittedly did not have any prior contact with defendant and thus had no reason to believe he might be involved in the possible retaliatory shooting or other criminal activity....

Moreover, defendant's conduct after he saw the officers enter the courtyard did not provide an objectively reasonable basis for suspecting that he had engaged in or was about to engage in criminal activity. Defendant simply started quickly pedaling away from the officers and put his hand in his pocket.

We question whether this conduct should even be considered flight because the officers did not initially indicate to defendant that he should stop. Defendant could have believed that he should simply get out of the officers' way....

Defendant argues that his failure to immediately stop his bicycle in response to Officer Delaprida's command could not be found to constitute obstruction within the intent of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) as interpreted in Crawley [187 N.J. 440 (2006)]. We have no need to address this argument because we conclude that even if defendant's failure to obey Officer Delaprida's command to stop would have provided an adequate basis to arrest him for obstruction, the evidence obtained when Officer Delaprida and his partner grabbed defendant was not 'sufficiently attenuated' from the taint of the unconstitutional stop to justify its admission into evidence....

In New Jersey, the three-factor test reaffirmed in Williams [192 N.J. 1 (2007)] delineates the circumstances in which the attenuation exception may be properly applied. Under those factors, the State failed to establish a 'significant attenuation' between the unconstitutional stop of defendant and the seizure of the drugs he discarded following that stop." (Alyssa Aiello, A.D.P.D.)

http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a4530-07.pdf

In this case recently decided on appeal, a NJ criminal defense appeal lawyer successfully argued that the police's search and seizure of evidence was illegal. The court found that the State could not establish that the police were acting under the community caretaking or plain view exceptions.

State v. Andre Scott, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-1787-07T4 (November 17, 2009) - Conviction reversed, suppression ordered. "The State justifies the warrantless entry of the police officers into the first-floor apartment as a part of their community caretaking function.

However, ... , the motion judge found that the police's community caretaking function arose only after they observed the open door to the first floor apartment -- an observation necessarily made from the building's hallway, since the judge found that the building's owner, Martin, was unable to see the doorway from her vantage point at the entrance to the residence.

Nothing in the record suggests that the police had any authorization to enter the hallway, either from Martin or from a first-floor resident. Their presence in that hallway thus violated the Fourth Amendment....

[T]he State has failed to meet its burden of proving that it was reasonably fulfilling its community caretaking function when it entered, first, the building owned by Martin, second, the first-floor apartment in that building and, third, the bedroom occupied by defendant and Taylor.

We further conclude that because the police were not lawfully on the premises, their invocation of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement as justification for seizure of the drugs found on the bedroom nightstand fails." (Michael Noriega, Designated Counsel)

http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a1787-07.pdf

The following criminal case was recently decided on appeal pertaining to the State's failure to produce an expert witness from a GPS manufacturer. The State sought to introduce evidence from the defendant's GPS despite the absence of expert testimony. Summary by Mark Friedman.

State v. Eric Pittman, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-2569-08T4 (November 4, 2009) - Order denying admission of evidence from Global Positioning System (GPS), State's motion for reconsideration, and State's motion to reopen affirmed.

"Specifically, the State sought to introduce evidence of the location of defendant's Yukon motor vehicle, on which a GPS unit had been installed pursuant to court order, to show that the Yukon traveled to the vicinity of an apartment in Edison where guns, drugs, and drug paraphernalia were later seized pursuant to a search warrant.

No independent surveillance corroborated defendant's location and travel on the day in question.... [T]he State [argued] that an expert from Orion was not necessary for admission of the GPS evidence, because the device's technology has been generally accepted as scientifically reliable.... [The trial court concluded] that while it was satisfied the GPS system was an appropriate technology in general, 'the question came down to this particular system, the Orion system ... that was installed by the county prosecutor's office in the defendant's vehicle.

Whether or not this system was an appropriate method of calculating one's position in the world.'... Here, the trial judge decided that expert testimony, beyond that of McDonald, who attested only to the acceptance of GPS technology in general, was essential to determining the accuracy and trustworthiness, and therefore admissibility, of the particular GPS device used in this case.

We agree.... The State's belated effort to reopen the N.J.R.E. 104 hearing nine months after commencement of the proceeding and seventeen months after the issue was raised is simply too little, too late. The State declined many requests and opportunities to present the expert proof deemed necessary by the court to close the gaps identified in McDonald's and Palfy's testimonies. Moreover, when the State finally relented after the close of evidence and resolution of the issue, it failed to make an offer of proof to assure the court that its expressed concerns would be satisfied by the proposed testimony." (Joshua D. Altman; Steven D. Altman, on the brief).

http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a2569-08.pdf

Searches and seizures made under a warrant are the most difficult to challenge. The reason for this is that such searches are presumed to be valid and the burden to prove otherwise is upon the defense. This is in contrast to warrantless searches, which are presumed to be illegal unless the state can prove otherwise.

A warrant can only be issued after a finding by a judge that there is "probable cause." Therefore, before a warrant can be issued, the law enforcement officer who is seeking the warrant must submit a "probable cause" affidavit to the judge. Probable cause "exists when an officer has a well-founded suspicion or belief of guilt which may constitute something less than proof needed to convict and something more than a raw, unsupported suspicion." State v. McKenna, 228 N.J. Super. 468, 474 (App. Div. 1998) (citing State v. Davis, 50 N.J. 16, 23 (1967), cert. den., 389 U.S. 1054 (1968)). It is not a rigid concept; rather, it is a "flexible, nontechnical concept." State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 120 (1987) (citation omitted). A court determines the existence of probable cause by applying a "common-sense, practical standard." Ibid.

Continue reading "NJ Search Warrant Law (Part I - Overview)" »

Police in New Jersey are obviously trained to spot signs of criminal activity during routine traffic stops. However, police do not have the right to search your car just because you have been pulled over for a motor vehicle offense.

The first step in determining whether police can search your car is whether the police had "reasonable suspicion" to stop you in the first place. Law enforcement officials may stop motor vehicles when they have a reasonable suspicion that either the vehicle or occupant is subject to seizure for violation of the law. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 664, (1973). New Jersey Courts have held that a police officer's observation of a motor vehicle offense is sufficient to justify a stop. State v. Murphy, 238 N.J. Super. 546, 553 (App. Div. 1990).

Next, it is important to keep in mind that any search made without a warrant is presumed to be illegal unless an exception to the warrant requirement can be shown by police. In the context of automobile searches, the most frequently found exceptions to police needing a warrant include: 1) Search of vehicle after arrest. This exception is no longer allowed by the courts in New Jersey; 2) The so-called "automobile exception. Under current law (see State v. Pena-Flores) this requires police to have both a) "probable cause" and b) exigent circumstances;" 3) abandonment; and 4) consent.

If police have searched your vehicle and found drugs, weapons, or other contraband and none of the exceptions to the warrant requirement exist (or are subject to challenge) an attorney skilled in pre-trial motions may be able to have the evidence tossed out after a suppression hearing. If you have been convicted of a crime after such a search, it may be possible to reverse your conviction and arrest on appeal.