New Jersey Criminal Defense Attorney Blog

In a hypothetical case, an NJ driver is observed operating their vehicle erratically near the border of Pennsylvania or New York. A NJ State Police Officer follows the vehicle, which turns onto the bridge and proceeds across the state line. The Trooper follows, pulling the vehicle over in the neighboring state and ultimately arresting the driver for an NJ DWI. Is this legal? Does the NJ municipal court have jurisdiction? The answer is not as clear as it may seem.

Because a municipal court has limited jurisdiction, it is obligated to assess whether or not it has the power to act in a particular matter before it; the authority of the court to adjudicate disputes must be found in legislative grants of jurisdiction. State v. Garcia, 297 N.J. Super. 108, (Ch. Div. 1996).

N.J.S.A. 2B:12-16(a), the basic grant of municipal court territorial jurisdiction, provides that the court has jurisdiction over cases arising within the territory of the municipality in which it sits; it defines that territory, however, as also including property or premises located partly in and partly outside the municipality. Garcia, supra, 297 N.J. Super. at 108.

The power to arrest and prosecute for offenses committed "on the bridges" has been set forth in pertinent legislation adopted by New Jersey and Pennsylvania. N.J.S.A. 32:4-6; Pa. Stat Ann. tit. 36 § 3504.1. Though there are obscurities in the statutory language, the legislative purpose to afford concurrent jurisdiction to New Jersey and Pennsylvania over all offenses committed anywhere on the "bridges" is clear. Garcia, supra, 297 N.J. Super. at 108.

In Garcia, where the defendant was involved in an accident on a bridge over the Delaware River that connected New Jersey and Pennsylvania, the initiation of prosecution of defendant in New Jersey for careless driving and leaving the scene of an accident vested the municipal court "nearest the site of the offenses with jurisdiction over the matter." Ibid.

Calhoun Street Bridge is owned and operated by the Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission. N.J.S.A. 32:4-6 provides, in part, (1) that the Delaware River Port Authority's police force may "make arrests for crimes, misdemeanors, and the offenses of any character committed upon said bridges" and (2) that upon an arrest, the offender may be taken to a proper judicial officer of Pennsylvania or New Jersey "without respect to the portion of the bridge" where the offense may have been committed or the offender may have been arrested. See also State v. Holden, 46 N.J. 361, 363 (1966).

N.J.S.A. 53:2-1 sets forth the powers and jurisdiction of the New Jersey State Police. It provides:

The members of the State Police shall be subject to the call of the Governor. They shall be peace officers of the State, shall primarily be employed in furnishing adequate police protection to the inhabitants of rural sections, shall give first aid to the injured and succor the helpless, and shall have in general the same powers and authority as are conferred by law upon police officers and constables.

They shall have power to prevent crime, to pursue and apprehend offenders and to obtain legal evidence necessary to insure the conviction of such offenders in the courts. They shall have power to execute any lawful warrant or order of arrest issued against any person, and to make arrests without warrant for violations of the law committed in their presence, and for felonies committed the same as are or may be authorized by law for other peace officers.

They may co-operate with any other State department, or any State or local authority in detecting crime, apprehending criminals and preserving law and order; but the State Police shall not be used as a posse in any municipality except upon order of the Governor when requested by the governing body of such municipality; provided, however, that the Superintendent of State Police, or the person in charge thereof, shall, upon request made to him by the superintendent of elections of any county of this State, assign for use on any election day officers and troopers, not to exceed fifteen in number in any one county, to aid such superintendents of elections in the enforcement of the election laws of this State.

They may act as inspectors of motor vehicles and as wardens in the protection of the forests, and the fish and game of the State. With respect to enforcement of the provisions of the "New Jersey Alcoholic Beverage Control Act," Title 33 of the Revised Statutes, they shall have all the powers conferred upon "officers" pursuant to that title. They shall have the authority to investigate any offenses or violations occurring on the waters of this State, as defined in section 1 of P.L. 1986, c. 150 (C. 53:1-11.10), and to stop and board a vessel in the waters of the State to determine whether the vessel complies with State and federal boating safety laws and shall have the power to order a vessel that does not comply with these laws to return immediately to shore. They shall have the authority, in accordance with applicable State and federal laws, rules and regulations, to take appropriate action as authorized by the United States Coast Guard to assist the United States Coast Guard in the enforcement of any safety and security zone established by the United States Coast Guard Captain of the Port for the Port of New York and New Jersey or the Port of Philadelphia. They shall have the authority to perform all of the duties of members of the State Capitol Police Force as defined in section 2 of P.L. 1977, c. 135 (C. 52:17B-9.2).

Nowhere in the State Police's jurisdictional grant is there any authority whatsoever for a member of that force to make an arrest inside the State of Pennsylvania. In that, there does not appear to be any statutory authority of any kind for an officer of the New Jersey State Police to follow and subsequently arrest a defendant outside the State of New Jersey, whether in Pennsylvania or any other state. Simply put, State Police Officers of the State of New Jersey become mere private citizens after crossing into Pennsylvania. An NJ officer would therefore be without probable cause to arrest a defendant in the State of Pennsylvania.

While N.J.S.A. 32:4-6 provides authority to members of the Delaware River Port Authority to make such arrest, the statute is completely inapplicable to the case at bar. The statute does not mention the Delaware Joint River Toll Bridge Commission, of which the Calhoun Street Bridge is owned and operated by. Moreover the statute gives absolutely no authority to members of the New Jersey State Police to make such arrests.

In order for our hypothetical Court to hear the instant matter, two elements must be satisfied: 1) The arresting officer must have been authorized to make an arrest inside the State of Pennsylvania; and 2) The court must have jurisdiction. Neither element is satisfied in our case. This court should therefore dismiss the summons against defendant.

26-year-old Rainer O. Calderon of Colts Neck was arrested and charged on June 10 of being the leader of an illicit pharmaceutical drug ring. Colts Neck Police, along with members of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration Office of Criminal Investigations raided Calderon's home, leading to his arrest.

Colts Neck Police have charged Calderon with forgery, leading a narcotics-trafficking network, and obtaining a controlled dangerous substance by fraud. He had also been charged by Freehold Township Police with forgery, receiving stolen property and related crimes.

During a search of Calderon's home, police confiscated $331, Calderon's car, marijuana, a hypodermic syringe, medical records, prescription blanks and documents related to the drug ring.

Police have also arrested two other individuals, who police obtained oxycodone from various New Jersey pharmacies illegally and passed the pills along to Calderon.

Calderon is lodged in the Monmouth County Jail, Freehold Township, in lieu of $410,000 with no "ten percent" option.

State v. Germaine A. Handy, ? N.J. Super. ?, 2010 N.J. Super. LEXIS 53 (April 12, 2010) - Conviction reversed, suppression ordered. "The appeal requires us to determine whether evidence found during the search incident to Handy's arrest should have been suppressed because the dispatcher who incorrectly informed the arresting officer that there was an outstanding arrest warrant acted unreasonably under the circumstances, even though the conduct of the arresting officer himself was reasonable....

Rather than a past clerical error, such as neglecting to remove a no-longer valid warrant, the police dispatcher in this case inaccurately reported to the police officer in the field that there was an active warrant for Handy when, in fact, there were significant discrepancies in the spelling of the first name and the date of birth that were not reported at the same time, thereby causing the arrest of the wrong person. Had the police dispatcher reported the discrepancies at the same time as the existence of the warrant, Drogo would have attempted to verify that the warrant was for Handy before, rather than after, the arrest....

The deterrent value of applying the exclusionary rule in this case is, in our view, quite significant.... The police dispatcher is the crucial link between the officer in the field and police headquarters. The officer depends on receiving the correct information from the dispatcher, information such as whether there is or is not an outstanding arrest warrant for the person with whom the officer is then face to face....

In our view, failure to extend the requirement of reasonable conduct to the police dispatcher under the circumstances of this case would have considerable potential to 'dilute' the protections against unreasonable search and seizure guaranteed by the New Jersey Constitution and, we believe, the Fourth Amendment."

State v. Christopher Felix, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-2788-08T4 (April 8, 2010) - Conviction reversed, suppression ordered. "Initially, the encounter with Felix amounted to only a field inquiry, as Holman and then Nanos approached him and began asking him questions....

We discern no illegality or bad faith in the field inquiry here, at least in its initial phases.... However, the initial field inquiry in this case progressed into an investigatory stop under Terry. An investigatory stop, unlike a field inquiry, is characterized by a detention in which the person approached by a police officer would not reasonably feel free to leave, even though the encounter falls short of a formal arrest....

Nanos's specific question, asking whether Felix 'had anything illegal on his person,' escalated the field inquiry into a Terry investigatory stop, by insinuating that Felix might have contraband in his possession.... Consequently, the motion judge's determination that Nanos's question to Felix about whether he had anything illegal in his possession was 'innocuous' and consistent with Terry was incorrect as a matter of law....

Nanos asked the question after he had 'confirmed that [Felix] was supposed to be on the property,' according to Nanos's own testimony.... Having satisfied himself that Felix was not trespassing, Nanos offered nothing amounting to a 'particularized suspicion' that would warrant the specific question asked. While it is apparently true that the house was a known 'crack house,' that alone cannot be the basis for the Terry stop of someone who is there with the permission of an owner or resident. He did not know Felix, so there was no testimony that he was a known drug dealer or user.... Nanos never expressed any concern about a weapon, nor was that the purport of his question."

NJSA 2C:36-2. Use or possession with intent to use, disorderly persons offense.

It is illegal in New Jersey to possess basically anything that can be used to inhale, inject, or otherwise ingest an illegal drug.

The applicable statute reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled dangerous substance, controlled substance analog or toxic chemical in violation of the provisions of chapter 35 of this title. Any person who violates this section is guilty of a disorderly persons offense."

A disorderly persons offense is punishable by up to 6 months in jail and a $1,000 fine. Unfortunately, while a conditional discharge is available for some first time offenders who are caught with under 50 grams of marijuana, it is not available if you are caught only with paraphernalia.

Vincente Esteves, a man who once owned a gated mansion in Manalapan that featured an indoor movie theatre, pleaded guilty before Judge Anthony J. Mellaci, Jr. in Freehold on March 25 of running a million dollar a week cocaine trafficking enterprise out of that home.

During his plea hearing, Esteves implicated five alleged co-defendants, all New Jersey residents but did not mention his wife, Chantal, who is alleged to have assisted in the operation. Esteves pleaded guilty to second-degree racketeering and conspiracy, and first -degree charges of leading a drug trafficking network, drug possession with intent to distribute, and money laundering. He faces up to 25 years in prison.

State v. Darryl T. Hester, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-6528-06T4 (March 18, 2010) - Convictions reversed. "In summary, evidence was presented to the jury that the police had conducted a month to a month and one-half long surveillance of the activities at Banks's apartment that first focused on Banks but later focused on defendant, as well.

During the course of that surveillance, defendant was observed as the seller in a hand-to-hand transfer of drugs, a criminal act, and that act constituted part of the evidence used by the police to establish probable cause for the issuance of warrants to search the apartment and defendant's person.

Additionally, controlled purchases from defendant had taken place. As the result of the police's investigation and the evidence thus garnered, court-authorized warrants were issued ..., leading to the discovery, not only the cocaine and heroin that formed the basis for the indictments, but also marijuana, providing the basis for another uncharged crime. Defense counsel did not object to the introduction of any of this evidence, and indeed, solicited the majority of it....

[D]efense counsel sought, by examining Buckley regarding his surveillance, to elicit testimony that would implicate Banks as possessor of the drugs found in Banks's apartment and would exculpate defendant. The opposite occurred, since defense counsel's questions led to the disclosure that Buckley had witnessed defendant as the transferror in a hand-to-hand transfer of drugs....

[E]ven if a proper basis for introduction of other crimes evidence had been identified and accepted, the trial judge must instruct the jury on the limited purpose for which the evidence is admissible and must inform the jury of the uses of the evidence that are prohibited.... This did not occur. Rather, the judge merely gave a contemporaneous instruction to the jury that it must focus on the crimes charged in the indictment....

We are satisfied that, in the circumstances presented, the combination of introduction of other crimes evidence with evidence that probable cause for the issuance of warrants had been established on the basis of evidence that was not presented to the jury was sufficient to create a real possibility of an unjust result, thereby constituting plain error. While much of the evidence was introduced through the efforts of defense counsel, the errors committed were sufficient to 'cut mortally into [defendant's] substantive rights,' [citation omitted], therefore requiring a reversal of defendant's conviction." (Frank M. Gennaro, Designated Counsel)

In this recent NJ Criminal Appeal, the defense attorney successfully argued that a police search of a vehicle's glove box was illegal.

State v. Ricardo Manuel Ortiz and Arnaldo A. Ortiz, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-4026-08T4 (December 28, 2009) - Suppression of evidence affirmed. Although the stop of the vehicle for having too-darkly tinted windows was justified, and the smell of unburned marijuana gave the police "a well-grounded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot," "we conclude that sufficient credible evidence in the record supports the motion judge's finding that the police lacked exigency to search the glove compartment without first obtaining a warrant, either by telephone or in person....

[A]t all times, the occupants of the SUV complied with police directions, including moving their vehicle some distance from the scene. There was no indication they knew Arnaldo's vehicle contained CDS, nor was any CDS in plain view. Far from presenting any threat to the officers' safety or preservation of the evidence, one of the SUV occupants, a relative of defendants, was actually given the keys to Arnaldo's Honda to take possession of the vehicle upon the defendants' transport to jail....

Equally lacking is any indication that any delay occasioned by obtaining a warrant to search the car would have jeopardized either the officers' safety or the integrity of the evidence.... Koeppen, upon opening the glove compartment and observing the bag, did not believe the bag contained a weapon of any kind. Even if Koeppen lawfully opened the glove compartment, there would have been no justification under the State's theory for further searching the plastic bag, which did not appear on its exterior to contain any weapon therein....

Here, to avoid suppression as fruit of the poisonous automobile search, the State had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the cocaine in Ricardo's shoe and sock would have inevitably been discovered as a result of a search incident to a lawful warrant or an inventory search prefatory to his incarceration on that charge. Yet the State has offered no evidence -- much less clear and convincing proof -- of the circumstances attending Ricardo's stationhouse search....

Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that Ricardo would have been lawfully confined to a municipal or county detention facility, that he would not otherwise have been released on his own recognizance, or have posted bail if, in fact, bail had been set on the warrant charge. To the contrary, the record is silent even as to the underlying charge on which Ricardo's outstanding warrant was based." (Marc E. Lieberman)
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a4026-08.pdf

In this recent criminal case won on NJ appeal, the defendant convinced the appeals court that his expert witness should have been allowed to testify that he was a drug addict. This would have assisted the defense that drugs found on his person were for personal use and not for sale.

State v. Ryshan Tatum, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-1313-08T4 (December 23, 2009) - Convictions reversed following remand for hearing on whether expert's opinion could be of assistance to the jury.

"Although the judge found that McCorkell qualified as an 'expert in alcohol and substance abuse counseling with an expertise in therapy and counseling,' he concluded that McCorkell's testimony would not have been of assistance to the jury, or that even if it would, it would not have affected the result of the case.

We disagree with the first proposition and find the second proposition irrelevant under the Supreme Court's remand order.... The average juror would not know about the standards for determining drug addiction set forth in the DSM-IV. Thus, an expert's opinion applying those standards to determine if defendant was a drug addict would be useful in deciding whether that was so or not.

Since in this case, the defense was that the drugs were for personal use, defendant's status as an addict would obviously be relevant. Of course, drug addicts can and often do sell drugs to support their habit, but if a defendant was a drug addict at the time of the offense, it is at least more likely that he had the drugs for personal use....

Since McCorkell's testimony could be of assistance to a jury and since it cannot be barred simply because he relied on the kind of hearsay that experts in his field rely on, and because he did not squarely address the substance of Graves's testimony, we are obliged to reverse and remand for a new trial."

http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a1313-08.pdf

Mercer County Superior Court
Mailing Address:
PO Box 8068
Trenton, NJ 08608
Street Address:
209 S Broad Street
Trenton, NJ 08608

East Windsor Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
80 One Mile Road, East
Windsor, NJ 08520
Phone Number: (609) 448-3228

Ewing Township Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
2 Jake Garzio Drive
Ewing, NJ
Phone Number: (609) 883-2900

Hamilton Township
Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
1270 Whitehorse Ave Cn00150
Hamilton, NJ
Phone Number: (609) 581-4071

Hightstown Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
148 N Main Street
Hightstown, NJ
Phone Number: (609) 490-5105

Hopewell Borough Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
PO Box 343
Hopewell, NJ
Phone Number: (609) 466-0968

Hopewell Township Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
201 Washington Crossing
Pennington Road Titusville, NJ
Phone Number: (609) 737-1035

Lawrence Township Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
Municipal Square P.O. Box 6006 Lawrenceville, NJ
Phone Number: (609) 844-7159

Pennington Borough Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
30 North Main Street
Pennington, NJ
Phone Number: (609) 737-1016

Princeton Borough Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
PO Box 390 1 Monument Dr
Princeton, NJ
Phone Number: (609) 497-7600

Princeton Township Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
400 Witherspoon St.
Princeton Township, NJ
Phone Number: (609) 924-5042

Trenton Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
225 N Clinton Ave
PO Box 1360 Trenton, NJ
Phone Number: (609) 989-3700

Washington Township Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
1117 Route 130
Robbinsville, NJ
Phone Number: (609) 259-7085

West Windsor Municipal Court
Mailing Address:
20 Municipal Drive PO Box 38 Princeton Junction, NJ
Phone Number: (609) 799-0915

Under current New Jersey law, a prosecutor may veto a criminal defendant's application for Pre-trial Intervention (PTI). However, that power is not without limitation. In this NJ criminal case recently decided on appeal, the Court reversed a prosecutor's refusal to allow the defendant to enter the PTI program. Summary by Mark Friedman.

State v. Jovan Alvarez, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-0501-08T4 (November 24, 2009) - "Defendant Jovan Alvarez appeals his judgment of conviction of August 15, 2008, on the basis that the prosecutor abused his discretion in refusing defendant admission into the pretrial intervention program (PTI) governed by N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12 to -22 and Rule 3:28, and its accompanying Guidelines for Operation of Pretrial Intervention in New Jersey.

We agree. Although defendant was accepted into the PTI program, the prosecutor objected to his admission into the program on the basis that defendant did not accept full responsibility for his criminal conduct....

We do not find a factual basis in this statement to support the prosecutor's conclusion that defendant did not accept responsibility for his criminal conduct. Defendant quite plainly admitted that he had been using and distributing marijuana and that he was very sorry he had done so. Although the prosecutor specifically contended that defendant denied selling drugs and claimed he only used them, that is a clearly mistaken reading of the PTI interview record.

Defendant admitted selling drugs, but explained that he was doing so to support his own drug habit. Defendant's statement in the PTI evaluation supports the PTI Program Director's conclusion that '[t]he defendant accepted responsibility for his involvement in the instant offense and further expressed remorse for his actions.

This is viewed as an indication of his apparent amenability to rehabilitation.'... We conclude that the prosecutor's decision to deny defendant admission into the PTI program goes 'so wide of the mark' that it constitutes a 'patent and gross abuse of discretion.'

Defendant is a good candidate for the rehabilitative efforts of PTI.... Defendant's conviction is reversed, and he shall be admitted into the PTI program. The time he has spent on probation for this offense shall be counted toward his time in PTI." (Jane M. Personette)
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a0501-08.pdf

Police in New Jersey are obviously trained to spot signs of criminal activity during routine traffic stops. However, police do not have the right to search your car just because you have been pulled over for a motor vehicle offense.

The first step in determining whether police can search your car is whether the police had "reasonable suspicion" to stop you in the first place. Law enforcement officials may stop motor vehicles when they have a reasonable suspicion that either the vehicle or occupant is subject to seizure for violation of the law. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 6641973). New Jersey Courts have held that a police officer's observation of a motor vehicle offense is sufficient to justify a stop. State v. Murphy, 238 N.J. Super. 546, 553 (App. Div. 1990).

Next, it is important to keep in mind that any search made without a warrant is presumed to be illegal unless an exception to the warrant requirement can be shown by police. In the context of automobile searches, the most frequently found exceptions to police needing a warrant include: 1) Search of vehicle after arrest. This exception is no longer allowed by the courts in New Jersey; 2) The so-called "automobile exception. Under current law (see State v. Pena-Flores) this requires police to have both a) "probable cause" and b) exigent circumstances;" 3) abandonment; and 4) consent.

If police have searched your vehicle and found drugs, weapons, or other contraband and none of the exceptions to the warrant requirement exist (or are subject to challenge) an attorney skilled in pre-trial motions may be able to have the evidence tossed out after a suppression hearing. If you have been convicted of a crime after such a search, it may be possible to reverse your conviction and arrest on appeal.

In a joint-operation conducted by the Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office, the Monmouth County Sheriff's Office, the US Marshal's Service, the New Jersey Parole Board, and the Asbury Park and Neptune Police Departments, nearly 100 fugitives were arrested over the course of three days last weekend.

Many of the defendants arrested in Monmouth County are suspected of felony charges.
These include gang-related crimes, aggravated assaults, burglaries, and drug charges. Most of the arrests were made in the cities of Neptune and Asbury Park.

Police also seized various firearms as well as drugs including large amounts of heroin and marijuana. Most of the suspects are lodged at the Monmouth County Jail, Freehold Township.

Eatontown police working with the Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office arrested Frederick Hargrove and also seized nearly $60,000 worth of suspected heroin this week. Hargrove is suspected of running a major drug trafficking ring in Monmouth County.

Police say they conducted numerous controlled heroin buys from Hargrove using undercover officers. Hargrove was allegedly found with nearly 3,000 bags of heroin packaged for sale, blank prescription pads and almost $2,000 in cash.

The suspect has been charged with two second-degree drug offenses as well as and 16 third-degree crimes and related charges. Hargrove is lodged at the Monmouth County Jail in Freehold Township in lieu of $320,000 bail.

Hargrove's roommate, Kristina Marie Chapman, was also arrested for stealing blank prescription pads from a pharmacy where she worked. If you have been arrested or convicted of a drug charge in Monmouth County or Ocean County, call an experienced Freehold-based criminal defense attorney for an evaluation of your case.

If you have been arrested or charged with a drug offense in New Jersey, you may be eligible for entry into "Drug Court." Drug Court is an alternative to prison for certain individuals charged with non-violent drug offenses.

Nearly 80% of all crimes in New Jersey are committed by individuals under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Research has shown that New Jersey prisons are simply overloaded with non-violent drug offenders. In response, the New Jersey Courts implemented the Drug Court program. Combining drug treatment and supervision has been shown to be much more effective in reducing drug dependency that simply sending an individual to prison.

Unlike a typical criminal trial, Drug Court is a non-adversarial process. Drug Court includes intense probation supervision, frequent and random drug screening, and drug treatment and counseling. You are eligible to enroll in Drug Court if you are a non-violent, drug offender. The program is specifically designed for defendants who probably would never have been involved with the criminal justice system if not for their drug problems. Applicants must be clinically examined and then screened by the Drug Court team before they are admitted into the program.

Continue reading "New Jersey Drug Court Overview" »