New Jersey Criminal Defense Attorney Blog

In a hypothetical case, an NJ driver is observed operating their vehicle erratically near the border of Pennsylvania or New York. A NJ State Police Officer follows the vehicle, which turns onto the bridge and proceeds across the state line. The Trooper follows, pulling the vehicle over in the neighboring state and ultimately arresting the driver for an NJ DWI. Is this legal? Does the NJ municipal court have jurisdiction? The answer is not as clear as it may seem.

Because a municipal court has limited jurisdiction, it is obligated to assess whether or not it has the power to act in a particular matter before it; the authority of the court to adjudicate disputes must be found in legislative grants of jurisdiction. State v. Garcia, 297 N.J. Super. 108, (Ch. Div. 1996).

N.J.S.A. 2B:12-16(a), the basic grant of municipal court territorial jurisdiction, provides that the court has jurisdiction over cases arising within the territory of the municipality in which it sits; it defines that territory, however, as also including property or premises located partly in and partly outside the municipality. Garcia, supra, 297 N.J. Super. at 108.

The power to arrest and prosecute for offenses committed "on the bridges" has been set forth in pertinent legislation adopted by New Jersey and Pennsylvania. N.J.S.A. 32:4-6; Pa. Stat Ann. tit. 36 § 3504.1. Though there are obscurities in the statutory language, the legislative purpose to afford concurrent jurisdiction to New Jersey and Pennsylvania over all offenses committed anywhere on the "bridges" is clear. Garcia, supra, 297 N.J. Super. at 108.

In Garcia, where the defendant was involved in an accident on a bridge over the Delaware River that connected New Jersey and Pennsylvania, the initiation of prosecution of defendant in New Jersey for careless driving and leaving the scene of an accident vested the municipal court "nearest the site of the offenses with jurisdiction over the matter." Ibid.

Calhoun Street Bridge is owned and operated by the Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission. N.J.S.A. 32:4-6 provides, in part, (1) that the Delaware River Port Authority's police force may "make arrests for crimes, misdemeanors, and the offenses of any character committed upon said bridges" and (2) that upon an arrest, the offender may be taken to a proper judicial officer of Pennsylvania or New Jersey "without respect to the portion of the bridge" where the offense may have been committed or the offender may have been arrested. See also State v. Holden, 46 N.J. 361, 363 (1966).

N.J.S.A. 53:2-1 sets forth the powers and jurisdiction of the New Jersey State Police. It provides:

The members of the State Police shall be subject to the call of the Governor. They shall be peace officers of the State, shall primarily be employed in furnishing adequate police protection to the inhabitants of rural sections, shall give first aid to the injured and succor the helpless, and shall have in general the same powers and authority as are conferred by law upon police officers and constables.

They shall have power to prevent crime, to pursue and apprehend offenders and to obtain legal evidence necessary to insure the conviction of such offenders in the courts. They shall have power to execute any lawful warrant or order of arrest issued against any person, and to make arrests without warrant for violations of the law committed in their presence, and for felonies committed the same as are or may be authorized by law for other peace officers.

They may co-operate with any other State department, or any State or local authority in detecting crime, apprehending criminals and preserving law and order; but the State Police shall not be used as a posse in any municipality except upon order of the Governor when requested by the governing body of such municipality; provided, however, that the Superintendent of State Police, or the person in charge thereof, shall, upon request made to him by the superintendent of elections of any county of this State, assign for use on any election day officers and troopers, not to exceed fifteen in number in any one county, to aid such superintendents of elections in the enforcement of the election laws of this State.

They may act as inspectors of motor vehicles and as wardens in the protection of the forests, and the fish and game of the State. With respect to enforcement of the provisions of the "New Jersey Alcoholic Beverage Control Act," Title 33 of the Revised Statutes, they shall have all the powers conferred upon "officers" pursuant to that title. They shall have the authority to investigate any offenses or violations occurring on the waters of this State, as defined in section 1 of P.L. 1986, c. 150 (C. 53:1-11.10), and to stop and board a vessel in the waters of the State to determine whether the vessel complies with State and federal boating safety laws and shall have the power to order a vessel that does not comply with these laws to return immediately to shore. They shall have the authority, in accordance with applicable State and federal laws, rules and regulations, to take appropriate action as authorized by the United States Coast Guard to assist the United States Coast Guard in the enforcement of any safety and security zone established by the United States Coast Guard Captain of the Port for the Port of New York and New Jersey or the Port of Philadelphia. They shall have the authority to perform all of the duties of members of the State Capitol Police Force as defined in section 2 of P.L. 1977, c. 135 (C. 52:17B-9.2).

Nowhere in the State Police's jurisdictional grant is there any authority whatsoever for a member of that force to make an arrest inside the State of Pennsylvania. In that, there does not appear to be any statutory authority of any kind for an officer of the New Jersey State Police to follow and subsequently arrest a defendant outside the State of New Jersey, whether in Pennsylvania or any other state. Simply put, State Police Officers of the State of New Jersey become mere private citizens after crossing into Pennsylvania. An NJ officer would therefore be without probable cause to arrest a defendant in the State of Pennsylvania.

While N.J.S.A. 32:4-6 provides authority to members of the Delaware River Port Authority to make such arrest, the statute is completely inapplicable to the case at bar. The statute does not mention the Delaware Joint River Toll Bridge Commission, of which the Calhoun Street Bridge is owned and operated by. Moreover the statute gives absolutely no authority to members of the New Jersey State Police to make such arrests.

In order for our hypothetical Court to hear the instant matter, two elements must be satisfied: 1) The arresting officer must have been authorized to make an arrest inside the State of Pennsylvania; and 2) The court must have jurisdiction. Neither element is satisfied in our case. This court should therefore dismiss the summons against defendant.

Actress Amy Locane, best known for her role on Melrose Place, is facing charges of DWI, vehicular homicide and assault by auto in Somerset County, New Jersey. This follows her arrest last week after allegedly colliding with another vehicle carrying a husband and wife while drunk driving. The driver of the vehicle was critically injured and the passenger was killed.

Police say that Locane was driving while intoxicated on July 4th when she drover her SUV into the passenger side of a sedan. The accident occurred in Montgomery Township.

Officers who arrived and noticed that Locane's breath smelled like alcohol and her eyes were red and watery. Her speech was apparently slurred. Police then arrested Locane and transported her to a nearby hospital for a blood test. Police say she later admitted to drinking wine before driving. She faces up to 10 years in New Jersey State Prison if convicted of all the charges she faces.

Two former employees of a family murdered in their Freehold, NJ home were arrested last week in connection with the crime. The victims, a brother and sister who owned a local Chinese restaurant, were slain in an apparent robbery attempt in their South Street home in the borough.

The two suspects were apprehended within minutes of the first report of the crime. This occurred when a driver observed one of the victims laying in the street with his hands tied and bleeding.

A second female victim was located in a bedroom, who had been stabbed to death. Freehold police and the Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office have charged Dong Biao Lin, 24 of New York along with Zeng Liang Chen, 20 also of New York with the crimes. The are accused of armed robbery, burglary, possession of a weapon, and felony murder.

The two were located on the outskirts of the borough and arrested by Freehold Township Police. This was after a second motorist saw the two and reported their whereabouts to police. The two are now lodged in the Monmouth County Jail in Freehold. Bail has been set at $3 Million.

A young Monmouth County man was found shot and killed outside of a Long Branch apartment complex last week. The discovery came after reports of gun shots were made in the area.

Shar-Ron Marquese Mackson, only 22, was found to be the victim.

Lamont Williams, 25, of Long Branch was later arrested and charged with Jackson's murder along with weapons charges. Williams surrendered to police Wednesday without incident.

New Jersey Assault Charges - NJSA 2C:12-1

§ 2C:12-1. Assault

a. Simple assault. A person is guilty of assault if he:

(1) Attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or(2) Negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or
(3) Attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.

Simple assault is a disorderly persons offense unless committed in a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent, in which case it is a petty disorderly persons offense.

b. Aggravated assault. A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:

(1) Attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely or knowingly or under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such injury; or

(2) Attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or

(3) Recklessly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or

(4) Knowingly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life points a firearm, as defined in section 2C:39-1 f., at or in the direction of another, whether or not the actor believes it to be loaded; or

(5) Commits a simple assault as defined in subsection a. (1), (2) or (3) of this section upon:

(a) Any law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his authority or because of his status as a law enforcement officer; or

(b) Any paid or volunteer fireman acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or otherwise clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of the duties of a fireman; or

(c) Any person engaged in emergency first-aid or medical services acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or otherwise clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of emergency first-aid or medical services; or

(d) Any school board member, school administrator, teacher, school bus driver or other employee of a public or nonpublic school or school board while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as a member or employee of a public or nonpublic school or school board or any school bus driver employed by an operator under contract to a public or nonpublic school or school board while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as a school bus driver; or

(e) Any employee of the Division of Youth and Family Services while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as an employee of the division; or

(f) Any justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Superior Court, judge of the Tax Court or municipal judge while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of judicial duties or because of his status as a member of the judiciary; or

(g) Any operator of a motorbus or the operator's supervisor or any employee of a rail passenger service while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties or because of his status as an operator of a motorbus or as the operator's supervisor or as an employee of a rail passenger service; or

(h) Any Department of Corrections employee, county corrections officer, juvenile corrections officer, State juvenile facility employee, juvenile detention staff member, juvenile detention officer, probation officer or any sheriff, undersheriff, or sheriff's officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his authority; or

(i) Any employee, including any person employed under contract, of a utility company as defined in section 2 of P.L.1971, c.224 (C.2A:42-86) or a cable television company subject to the provisions of the "Cable Television Act," P.L.1972, c.186 (C.48:5A-1 et seq.) while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of his duties in regard to connecting, disconnecting or repairing or attempting to connect, disconnect or repair any gas, electric or water utility, or cable television or telecommunication service; or

(6) Causes bodily injury to another person while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer in violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 or while operating a motor vehicle in violation of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:20-10. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a person shall be strictly liable for a violation of this subsection upon proof of a violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 or while operating a motor vehicle in violation of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:20-10 which resulted in bodily injury to another person; or

(7) Attempts to cause significant bodily injury to another or causes significant bodily injury purposely or knowingly or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such significant bodily injury; or

(8) Causes bodily injury by knowingly or purposely starting a fire or causing an explosion in violation of N.J.S.2C:17-1 which results in bodily injury to any emergency services personnel involved in fire suppression activities, rendering emergency medical services resulting from the fire or explosion or rescue operations, or rendering any necessary assistance at the scene of the fire or explosion, including any bodily injury sustained while responding to the scene of a reported fire or explosion. For purposes of this subsection, "emergency services personnel" shall include, but not be limited to, any paid or volunteer fireman, any person engaged in emergency first-aid or medical services and any law enforcement officer. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a person shall be strictly liable for a violation of this paragraph upon proof of a violation of N.J.S.2C:17-1 which resulted in bodily injury to any emergency services personnel; or

(9) Knowingly, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, points or displays a firearm, as defined in subsection f. of N.J.S.2C:39-1, at or in the direction of a law enforcement officer; or

(10) Knowingly points, displays or uses an imitation firearm, as defined in subsection f. of N.J.S.2C:39-1, at or in the direction of a law enforcement officer with the purpose to intimidate, threaten or attempt to put the officer in fear of bodily injury or for any unlawful purpose; or

(11) Uses or activates a laser sighting system or device, or a system or device which, in the manner used, would cause a reasonable person to believe that it is a laser sighting system or device, against a law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his authority. As used in this paragraph, "laser sighting system or device" means any system or device that is integrated with or affixed to a firearm and emits a laser light beam that is used to assist in the sight alignment or aiming of the firearm.

Aggravated assault under subsections b.(1) and b.(6) is a crime of the second degree; under subsections b.(2), b.(7), b.(9) and b.(10) is a crime of the third degree; under subsections b.(3) and b.(4) is a crime of the fourth degree; and under subsection b.(5) is a crime of the third degree if the victim suffers bodily injury, otherwise it is a crime of the fourth degree. Aggravated assault under subsection b.(8) is a crime of the third degree if the victim suffers bodily injury; if the victim suffers significant bodily injury or serious bodily injury it is a crime of the second degree. Aggravated assault under subsection b.(11) is a crime of the third degree.

c. (1) A person is guilty of assault by auto or vessel when the person drives a vehicle or vessel recklessly and causes either serious bodily injury or bodily injury to another. Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the fourth degree if serious bodily injury results and is a disorderly persons offense if bodily injury results.

(2) Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the third degree if the person drives the vehicle while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) and serious bodily injury results and is a crime of the fourth degree if the person drives the vehicle while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) and bodily injury results.

(3) Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the second degree if serious bodily injury results from the defendant operating the auto or vessel while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) while:

(a) on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property;

(b) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or

(c) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or resolution.

Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the third degree if bodily injury results from the defendant operating the auto or vessel in violation of this paragraph.

A map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under subparagraph (a) of paragraph (3) of this section.

It shall be no defense to a prosecution for a violation of subparagraph (a) or (b) of paragraph (3) of this subsection that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving through a school crossing. Nor shall it be a defense to a prosecution under subparagraph (a) or (b) of paragraph (3) of this subsection that no juveniles were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session.

As used in this section, "vessel" means a means of conveyance for travel on water and propelled otherwise than by muscular power.

d. A person who is employed by a facility as defined in section 2 of P.L.1977, c.239 (C.52:27G-2) who commits a simple assault as defined in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection a. of this section upon an institutionalized elderly person as defined in section 2 of P.L.1977, c.239 (C.52:27G-2) is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.

e. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2001, c.443).

f. A person who commits a simple assault as defined in paragraph (1), (2) or (3) of subsection a. of this section in the presence of a child under 16 years of age at a school or community sponsored youth sports event is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree. The defendant shall be strictly liable upon proof that the offense occurred, in fact, in the presence of a child under 16 years of age. It shall not be a defense that the defendant did not know that the child was present or reasonably believed that the child was 16 years of age or older. The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to create any liability on the part of a participant in a youth sports event or to abrogate any immunity or defense available to a participant in a youth sports event. As used in this act, "school or community sponsored youth sports event" means a competition, practice or instructional event involving one or more interscholastic sports teams or youth sports teams organized pursuant to a nonprofit or similar charter or which are member teams in a youth league organized by or affiliated with a county or municipal recreation department and shall not include collegiate, semi-professional or professional sporting events.

History:

L. 1978, c. 95; amended 1979, c. 178, § 22; 1981, c. 290, § 14; 1983, c. 101, § 1; 1985, c. 97, § 2; 1985, c. 444, § 1; 1990, c. 87, § 1; 1991, c. 237, § 2; 1991, c. 341, § 2; 1993, c. 219, § 2; 1995, c. 6, § 1; 1995, c. 181, § 1; 1995, c. 211, § 1; 1995, c. 307, § 2; 1997, c. 42, § 1; 1997, c. 119, § 1; 1999, c. 77, § 1, eff. April 30, 1999; 1999, c. 185, § 2, eff. Dec. 1, 1999; 1999, c. 281, § 1, eff. Feb. 1, 2000; 1999, c. 381, § 1, eff. Jan. 14, 2000; 2001, c. 215, § 1, eff. Aug. 20, 2001; 2001, c. 443, § 2, eff. Jan. 11, 2002; 2002, c. 53, § 1, eff. Aug. 3, 2002; 2003, c. 218, § 1, eff. Jan. 9, 2004; 2005, c. 2, § 1, eff. Jan. 19, 2005; 2006, c. 78, § 2, eff. Aug. 2, 2006.

Amendment Note:

2006 amendment, by Chapter 78, in b.(5)(d), inserted "public or nonpublic school or" three times preceding "school board"; and substituted "(i)" for "I" as the designation for the subparagraph following b.(5)(h).

Effective Dates:

Section 6 of L. 1999, c. 185 provides: "This act shall take effect on the first day of the fourth month after enactment." Chapter 185, L. 1999, was approved on August 19, 1999.

Section 2 of L. 1999, c. 281 provides: "This act shall take effect on the first day of the second month following enactment." Chapter 281, L. 1999, was approved on December 20, 1999.

Continue reading "New Jersey Assault Charges - NJSA 2C:12-1" »

26-year-old Rainer O. Calderon of Colts Neck was arrested and charged on June 10 of being the leader of an illicit pharmaceutical drug ring. Colts Neck Police, along with members of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration Office of Criminal Investigations raided Calderon's home, leading to his arrest.

Colts Neck Police have charged Calderon with forgery, leading a narcotics-trafficking network, and obtaining a controlled dangerous substance by fraud. He had also been charged by Freehold Township Police with forgery, receiving stolen property and related crimes.

During a search of Calderon's home, police confiscated $331, Calderon's car, marijuana, a hypodermic syringe, medical records, prescription blanks and documents related to the drug ring.

Police have also arrested two other individuals, who police obtained oxycodone from various New Jersey pharmacies illegally and passed the pills along to Calderon.

Calderon is lodged in the Monmouth County Jail, Freehold Township, in lieu of $410,000 with no "ten percent" option.

On 6/16/10 Highlands, NJ police were dispatched to Barberie Avenue to a report of a burglary in progress. Police later arrested Michael A. Smith, 21, of the same street for the crime.

Smith is accused of 5 counts of both burglary and theft. After searching his house, police uncovered car radios, GPS devices, cellular phones and other electronics equipment. Smith was lodged in the Monmouth County Jail, Freehold Township, in lieu of $15,000 bail. If convicted, Smith could face up to 5 years in prison for each offense.

State v. Germaine A. Handy, ? N.J. Super. ?, 2010 N.J. Super. LEXIS 53 (April 12, 2010) - Conviction reversed, suppression ordered. "The appeal requires us to determine whether evidence found during the search incident to Handy's arrest should have been suppressed because the dispatcher who incorrectly informed the arresting officer that there was an outstanding arrest warrant acted unreasonably under the circumstances, even though the conduct of the arresting officer himself was reasonable....

Rather than a past clerical error, such as neglecting to remove a no-longer valid warrant, the police dispatcher in this case inaccurately reported to the police officer in the field that there was an active warrant for Handy when, in fact, there were significant discrepancies in the spelling of the first name and the date of birth that were not reported at the same time, thereby causing the arrest of the wrong person. Had the police dispatcher reported the discrepancies at the same time as the existence of the warrant, Drogo would have attempted to verify that the warrant was for Handy before, rather than after, the arrest....

The deterrent value of applying the exclusionary rule in this case is, in our view, quite significant.... The police dispatcher is the crucial link between the officer in the field and police headquarters. The officer depends on receiving the correct information from the dispatcher, information such as whether there is or is not an outstanding arrest warrant for the person with whom the officer is then face to face....

In our view, failure to extend the requirement of reasonable conduct to the police dispatcher under the circumstances of this case would have considerable potential to 'dilute' the protections against unreasonable search and seizure guaranteed by the New Jersey Constitution and, we believe, the Fourth Amendment."

Manasquan Municipal Court

Location: 201 East Main Street
Manasquan, NJ 08736

Phone: (732) 223-0600

The judge in Manasquan Court is the Honorable Mark T. Apostolou. The prosecutor is James Carton, IV. The court administrator is Marie Higgins. Manasquan is a beach town, with many visitors frequenting the town during the summer months. This results in a spike in traffic tickets, DWI and criminal arrests.

§ 2C:17-1. Arson and related offenses

In New Jersey, arson is either a crime of the first or second degree, depending on the facts of the case. A first-degree crime is punishable by 10-20 years in prison, while a second-degree is punishable by by 5-10 years.

a. Aggravated arson. A person is guilty of aggravated arson, a crime of the second degree, if he starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his own property or another's:

(1) Thereby purposely or knowingly placing another person in danger of death or bodily injury; or

(2) With the purpose of destroying a building or structure of another; or

(3) With the purpose of collecting insurance for the destruction or damage to such property under circumstances which recklessly place any other person in danger of death or bodily injury; or

(4) With the purpose of destroying or damaging a structure in order to exempt the structure, completely or partially, from the provisions of any State, county or local zoning, planning or building law, regulation, ordinance or enactment under circumstances which recklessly place any other person in danger of death or bodily injury; or

(5) With the purpose of destroying or damaging any forest.

b. Arson. A person is guilty of arson, a crime of the third degree, if he purposely starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his own property or another's:

(1) Thereby recklessly placing another person in danger of death or bodily injury; or

(2) Thereby recklessly placing a building or structure of another in danger of damage or destruction; or

(3) With the purpose of collecting insurance for the destruction or damage to such property; or

(4) With the purpose of destroying or damaging a structure in order to exempt the structure, completely or partially, from the provisions of any State, county or local zoning, planning or building law, regulation, ordinance or enactment; or

(5) Thereby recklessly placing a forest in danger of damage or destruction.

c. Failure to control or report dangerous fire. A person who knows that a fire is endangering life or a substantial amount of property of another and either fails to take reasonable measures to put out or control the fire, when he can do so without substantial risk to himself, or to give prompt fire alarm, commits a crime of the fourth degree if:

(1) He knows that he is under an official, contractual, or other legal duty to prevent or combat the fire; or

(2) The fire was started, albeit lawfully, by him or with his assent, or on property in his custody or control.

d. Any person who, directly or indirectly, pays or accepts or offers to pay or accept any form of consideration including, but not limited to, money or any other pecuniary benefit, regardless of whether any consideration is actually exchanged for the purpose of starting a fire or causing an explosion in violation of this section commits a crime of the first degree.

e. Notwithstanding the provisions of any section of this Title to the contrary, if a person is convicted of aggravated arson pursuant to the provisions of subsection a. of this section and the structure which was the target of the offense was a health care facility or a physician's office, the sentence imposed shall include a term of imprisonment. The court may not suspend or make any other noncustodial disposition of a person sentenced pursuant to the provisions of this subsection.

f. Definitions. "Structure" is defined in section 2C:18-1. Property is that of another, for the purpose of this section, if any one other than the actor has a possessory, or legal or equitable proprietary interest therein. Property is that of another for the purpose of this section, if anyone other than the actor has a legal or equitable interest in the property including, but not limited to, a mortgage, pledge, lien or security interest therein. If a building or structure is divided into separately occupied units, any unit not occupied by the actor is an occupied structure of another.

As used in this section, "forest" means and includes any forest, brush land, grass land, salt marsh, wooded area and any combination thereof, including but not limited to, an open space area, public lands, wetlands, park lands, natural habitats, a State conservation area, a wildlife refuge area or any other designated undeveloped open space whether or not it is subject to specific protection under law.

As used in this section, "health care facility" means health care facility as defined in section 2 of P.L.1971, c. 136 (C. 26:2H-2).

g. Notwithstanding the provisions of any section of this Title to the contrary, if a person is convicted pursuant to the provisions of subsection a., b. or d. of this section and the structure which was the target of the offense was a church, synagogue, temple or other place of public worship, that person commits a crime of the first degree and the sentence imposed shall include a term of imprisonment. The term of imprisonment shall include a minimum term of 15 years, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole. The court may not suspend or make any other noncustodial disposition of a person sentenced pursuant to the provisions of this subsection.

West Long Branch Municipal Court

Location: 399 Monmouth Road
(corner of Deal and Monmouth Roads)
Oakhurst, NJ 07755

Phone: (732) 531-0291
Fax: (732) 531-0302

Court sessions are on Thursdays. The judge in West Long Branch Court is Louis Garippo, Jr., J.M.C. The court administrator is Kathleen McCann. West Long Branch Police issue a fair number of traffic and speeding tickets. A lot of underage drinking, DWI and drug possession arrests are also made in West Long Branch.

Shoplifting is a common offense in New Jersey which, depending on the value of the items alleged to have been taken, can subject you to from 6 months in jail to up to 10 years on prison.

c. Gradation. (1) Shoplifting constitutes a crime of the second degree under subsection b. of this section if the full retail value of the merchandise is $ 75,000 or more, or the offense is committed in furtherance of or in conjunction with an organized retail theft enterprise and the full retail value of the merchandise is $ 1,000 or more.

(2) Shoplifting constitutes a crime of the third degree under subsection b. of this section if the full retail value of the merchandise exceeds $ 500 but is less than $ 75,000, or the offense is committed in furtherance of or in conjunction with an organized retail theft enterprise and the full retail value of the merchandise is less than $ 1,000.

(3) Shoplifting constitutes a crime of the fourth degree under subsection b. of this section if the full retail value of the merchandise is at least $ 200 but does not exceed $ 500.

(4) Shoplifting is a disorderly persons offense under subsection b. of this section if the full retail value of the merchandise is less than $ 200.

The value of the merchandise involved in a violation of this section may be aggregated in determining the grade of the offense where the acts or conduct constituting a violation were committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, whether from the same person or several persons, or were committed in furtherance of or in conjunction with an organized retail theft enterprise.

Additionally, notwithstanding the term of imprisonment provided in N.J.S.2C:43-6 or 2C:43-8, any person convicted of a shoplifting offense shall be sentenced to perform community service as follows: for a first offense, at least ten days of community service; for a second offense, at least 15 days of community service; and for a third or subsequent offense, a maximum of 25 days of community service and any person convicted of a third or subsequent shoplifting offense shall serve a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 90 days.

a. Definitions. The following definitions apply to this section:

(1) "Shopping cart" means those push carts of the type or types which are commonly provided by grocery stores, drug stores or other retail mercantile establishments for the use of the public in transporting commodities in stores and markets and, incidentally, from the stores to a place outside the store;

(2) "Store or other retail mercantile establishment" means a place where merchandise is displayed, held, stored or sold or offered to the public for sale;

(3) "Merchandise" means any goods, chattels, foodstuffs or wares of any type and description, regardless of the value thereof;

(4) "Merchant" means any owner or operator of any store or other retail mercantile establishment, or any agent, servant, employee, lessee, consignee, officer, director, franchisee or independent contractor of such owner or proprietor;

(5) "Person" means any individual or individuals, including an agent, servant or employee of a merchant where the facts of the situation so require;

(6) "Conceal" means to conceal merchandise so that, although there may be some notice of its presence, it is not visible through ordinary observation;

(7) "Full retail value" means the merchant's stated or advertised price of the merchandise;

(8) "Premises of a store or retail mercantile establishment" means and includes but is not limited to, the retail mercantile establishment; any common use areas in shopping centers and all parking areas set aside by a merchant or on behalf of a merchant for the parking of vehicles for the convenience of the patrons of such retail mercantile establishment;

(9) "Under-ring" means to cause the cash register or other sale recording device to reflect less than the full retail value of the merchandise;

(10) "Antishoplifting or inventory control device countermeasure" means any item or device which is designed, manufactured, modified, or altered to defeat any antishoplifting or inventory control device;

(11) "Organized retail theft enterprise" means any association of two or more persons who engage in the conduct of or are associated for the purpose of effectuating the transfer or sale of shoplifted merchandise.

b. Shoplifting. Shoplifting shall consist of any one or more of the following acts:

(1) For any person purposely to take possession of, carry away, transfer or cause to be carried away or transferred, any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale by any store or other retail mercantile establishment with the intention of depriving the merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such merchandise or converting the same to the use of such person without paying to the merchant the full retail value thereof.

(2) For any person purposely to conceal upon his person or otherwise any merchandise offered for sale by any store or other retail mercantile establishment with the intention of depriving the merchant of the processes, use or benefit of such merchandise or converting the same to the use of such person without paying to the merchant the value thereof.

(3) For any person purposely to alter, transfer or remove any label, price tag or marking indicia of value or any other markings which aid in determining value affixed to any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale by any store or other retail mercantile establishment and to attempt to purchase such merchandise personally or in consort with another at less than the full retail value with the intention of depriving the merchant of all or some part of the value thereof.

(4) For any person purposely to transfer any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale by any store or other retail merchandise establishment from the container in or on which the same shall be displayed to any other container with intent to deprive the merchant of all or some part of the retail value thereof.

(5) For any person purposely to under-ring with the intention of depriving the merchant of the full retail value thereof.

(6) For any person purposely to remove a shopping cart from the premises of a store or other retail mercantile establishment without the consent of the merchant given at the time of such removal with the intention of permanently depriving the merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such cart.

d. Presumptions. Any person purposely concealing unpurchased merchandise of any store or other retail mercantile establishment, either on the premises or outside the premises of such store or other retail mercantile establishment, shall be prima facie presumed to have so concealed such merchandise with the intention of depriving the merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such merchandise without paying the full retail value thereof, and the finding of such merchandise concealed upon the person or among the belongings of such person shall be prima facie evidence of purposeful concealment; and if such person conceals, or causes to be concealed, such merchandise upon the person or among the belongings of another, the finding of the same shall also be prima facie evidence of willful concealment on the part of the person so concealing such merchandise.

e. A law enforcement officer, or a special officer, or a merchant, who has probable cause for believing that a person has willfully concealed unpurchased merchandise and that he can recover the merchandise by taking the person into custody, may, for the purpose of attempting to effect recovery thereof, take the person into custody and detain him in a reasonable manner for not more than a reasonable time, and the taking into custody by a law enforcement officer or special officer or merchant shall not render such person criminally or civilly liable in any manner or to any extent whatsoever.

Any law enforcement officer may arrest without warrant any person he has probable cause for believing has committed the offense of shoplifting as defined in this section.

A merchant who causes the arrest of a person for shoplifting, as provided for in this section, shall not be criminally or civilly liable in any manner or to any extent whatsoever where the merchant has probable cause for believing that the person arrested committed the offense of shoplifting.

f. Any person who possesses or uses any antishoplifting or inventory control device countermeasure within any store or other retail mercantile establishment is guilty of a disorderly persons offense.

§ 2C:15-1. Robbery is usually a second degree crime in New Jersey, punishable by 5 to 10 years in prison. However, Robbery can be a first degree (10-20 years in prison) if the defendant kills, attempts to kill, or seriously injures another in the course of the robbery.

a. Robbery defined. A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he:

(1) Inflicts bodily injury or uses force upon another; or

(2) Threatens another with or purposely puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury; or

(3) Commits or threatens immediately to commit any crime of the first or second degree.

An act shall be deemed to be included in the phrase "in the course of committing a theft" if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft or in immediate flight after the attempt or commission.

b. Grading. Robbery is a crime of the second degree, except that it is a crime of the first degree if in the course of committing the theft the actor attempts to kill anyone, or purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious bodily injury, or is armed with, or uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon.

In New Jersey, a person commits a petty disorderly persons offense if he or she is found guilty of Harassment. Petty disorderly conduct convictions carry up to 30 days in jail and a $500 fine. A person is guilty of Harassment if, with purpose to harass another, he:

a. Makes, or causes to be made, a communication or communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm;

b. Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or

c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person.

A communication under subsection a. may be deemed to have been made either at the place where it originated or at the place where it was received.

d. (Deleted by amendment, P.L. 2001, c. 443).

e. A person commits a crime of the fourth degree if, in committing an offense under this section, he was serving a term of imprisonment or was on parole or probation as the result of a conviction of any indictable offense under the laws of this State, any other state or the United States.

Public place defined; loitering to obtain or distribute CDS is a disorderly persons offense (misdemeanor) in New Jersey, punishable by up to 6 months in jail and a $1000 fine.

Under the statute, "Public place" means any place to which the public has access, including but not limited to a public street, road, thoroughfare, sidewalk, bridge, alley, plaza, park, recreation or shopping area, public transportation facility, vehicle used for public transportation, parking lot, public library or any other public building, structure or area.

b. A person, whether on foot or in a motor vehicle, commits a disorderly persons offense if (1) he wanders, remains or prowls in a public place with the purpose of unlawfully obtaining or distributing a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog; and (2) engages in conduct that, under the circumstances, manifests a purpose to obtain or distribute a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog.

c. Conduct that may, where warranted under the circumstances, be deemed adequate to manifest a purpose to obtain or distribute a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog includes, but is not limited to, conduct such as the following:

(1) Repeatedly beckoning to or stopping pedestrians or motorists in a public place;

(2) Repeatedly passing objects to or receiving objects from pedestrians or motorists in a public place;

(3) Repeatedly circling in a public place in a motor vehicle and on one or more occasions passing any object to or receiving any object from a person in a public place.

d. The element of the offense described in paragraph (1) of subsection b. of this section may not be established solely by proof that the actor engaged in the conduct that is used to satisfy the element described in paragraph (2) of subsection b. of this section.