New Jersey Criminal Defense Attorney Blog

State v. Brian Wilk, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-0628-09T4 (October 20, 2010) - Conviction reversed, suppression ordered. "The first two prongs of the automobile exception are present. Garcia stopped defendant unexpectedly and he had probable cause to believe that defendant's car contained contraband. Garcia had a well-grounded suspicion that heroin was in the car because defendant produced a torn cigarette filter.... We conclude, however, that the third prong was not met because exigent circumstances that precluded obtaining a warrant were not present. Neither the officers' safety nor the preservation of evidence were in jeopardy, and it was not impractical to obtain a warrant prior to searching defendant's car.... Garcia stopped defendant's car on Friday afternoon around 12:15 p.m. Defendant was the sole occupant; the surrounding area was part business and residential; the stop was not in a high crime area; traffic was light and not obstructed by defendant's car; back-up arrived immediately; defendant cooperated; and he was not arrested until after the search.... Moreover, police had control of the car and never left it unguarded. Katsigiannis remained with the car when Garcia took defendant to police headquarters because the car had been impounded. Impounding the car obviated any concern for the destruction of any potential evidence. Any delay in obtaining a search warrant would not have placed the officers' safety in jeopardy or compromised the integrity of the evidence."

State v. Calvin Johnson, Jr., unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-1567-09T1 (October 26, 2010) - Suppression of evidence affirmed.

Continue reading "NJ Police Search of Parked Car Deemed Illegal " »

Jeffrey Cameron v. Parole Board, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-0349-09T2 (October 21, 2010) - "We affirm the denial of parole, but reverse the future parole eligibility term and remand to the Board to establish a parole eligible term that will make appellant eligible for parole consideration in no more than thirty-six months. Appellant is serving a life term for an aggravated manslaughter committed in 1983. He has completed the twenty-five-year period of parole ineligibility imposed as part of that sentence.... The Parole Board exercised its authority under this subsection to establish an extended 120 month future parole eligibility term.... We conclude that the Board abused its discretion in establishing such a lengthy future parole eligibility term. Although the Board denied appellant parole, it recognized that there were some mitigating circumstances in his case that show he is making progress in reducing the likelihood of future criminal behavior.... Under these circumstances, we perceive no basis for establishment of a future parole eligibility term any longer than thirty-six months. This conclusion is reinforced by the 2009 amendment to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.56(a), which now precludes the Parole Board from establishing a future parole eligibility date that is 'more
than three years following the date on which an inmate was denied release.' L. 2009, c. 330, § 6. Although this amendment was not effective when appellant's future parole eligibility term was established, it reflects a legislative policy judgment that the kind of lengthy future eligibility term established in appellant's case is not appropriate under any circumstances."

In this recent appeal, the defendant's trial attorney failed to state why he was not moving to sever defendant's trial from that of his codefendant. This omission has already won the defendant an evidentiary hearing and could possibly lead to the reversal of his conviction.

State v. Ruel Russell, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-3249-08T4 (October 8, 2010) - Denial of PCR reversed, case remanded for evidentiary hearing.

Continue reading "Defendant May Have Conviction Overturned After Attorney Fails to Move for Severance" »

Howell Police make a large amount of criminal and DWI arrests. Shoplifting, Assault and Harassment charges are common in Howell Court. A lot of traffic tickets are also issued in the township, which borders Lakewood and Freehold Township.

Directions: From I-195: Use exit 31A for County Rd 547 S toward County Rd 524/Lakewood. Merge onto Lakewood Farmingdale Rd/Monmouth County Rd 547 S
Turn right at Old Tavern Rd.

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State v. Edward J. Roman, Sr., unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-2199-08T3 (October 19, 2010) - Denial of PCR affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanded for evidentiary hearing.

Continue reading "Defense Attorney's Failure to Retain Expert Wins Defendant PCR Hearing" »

State v. Marvin Mathis, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-3695-07T4 (October 12, 2010) - Denial of PCR reversed, case remanded for new hearing.

Continue reading "PCR Attorney Should Have Raised All Defendant's Arguments Says Appeals Court " »

State v. Reynaldo Corriano, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-2244-07T4 (October 19, 2010) - Denial of PCR affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanded for evidentiary hearing. "We come to a different conclusion with respect to defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of plea counsel. Such claims generally fall within the first exception to Rule 3:22-4(a): 'the ground for relief not previously asserted could not reasonably have been raised in any prior proceeding.' R. 3:22-4(a)(1).... Until defendant learned of the five-year parole term, he had no reason to suspect that his counsel was ineffective in advising him of the penal consequences of the plea. The allegations made by defendant respecting his counsel are based on evidence outside the record and should be heard in a PCR application ... if he has made out a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel.... However, we cannot determine with any certainty that such a failure occurred, particularly since, in connection with question 2 of NERA plea form, the term of parole was entered by hand and then changed, even though no answer to the question was recorded. The record before us also does not permit us to determine whether 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [defendant] would not have [pled] guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'... Defendant has certainly asserted that this is so, which is sufficient for a prima facie case under the second prong of Strickland, but the inquiry does not end there.... The attorney's testimony is certainly required to determine and evaluate these facts, as is the testimony of defendant."

State v. Henry Lee Conway, ? N.J. Super. ?, 2010 N.J. Super. LEXIS 204 (October 14, 2010) - Conviction and sentence vacated, case remanded for sentencing in accordance with the original plea agreement.

Continue reading "NJ Prosecutor Precluded from Reneging on Plea Agreement" »

State in the Interest of A.M., Jr., unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-5833-07T4 (October 25, 2010) - Adjudication of delinquency reversed. "[The Juvenile] contends that the trial court erred in admitting the victim's statements to the police under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule....

Continue reading "Juvenile's Statement Wrongfully Admitted as "Excited Utterance"" »

State v. B.Y., ? N.J. ?, 2010 N.J. LEXIS 1089 (October 26, 2010) - Appellate Division judgment reversed, conviction reinstated.

Continue reading "Supreme Court Reinstates Defendant's Conviction, Finding Confession was Voluntary" »

State v. V.B., unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-1844-09T3 (September 22, 2010) - Conviction affirmed, case remanded for reconsideration of sentence. "By statute, a ninety day sentence is mandatory for her fourth shoplifting conviction, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-11c. However, she contends that in imposing an additional ninety days beyond the statutory minimum, the Law Division judge did not consider the extent to which defendant's imprisonment would 'entail excessive hardship' to her children. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(11). Defendant has infant twins, for whom she was caring at the time she was sentenced. Clearly, in light of her prior criminal record, some period of incarceration is warranted as well as legally mandated. However, the difference between a three-month separation from a parent and a six-month separation may be significant in the life of an infant. The judge did not directly or clearly address the hardship issue or explain why the additional ninety day sentence was nonetheless justified in light of the hardship claim. See State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 504-05 (2005). We therefore remand this issue to the trial court for reconsideration. The issue on remand should be decided before defendant reports to jail, so that she can make appropriate arrangements for the care of her children in light of the length of her sentence."

State v. Lamar Alford, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-0804-07T4 (September 8, 2010) - Convictions affirmed, case remanded for re-sentencing. "Alford argues that the trial judge imposed an excessive sentence. He contends that the judge should have imposed a concurrent rather than consecutive term for the second degree certain persons charge.... The judge found that the weapons charge was a separate offense, and advances the public purpose of eliminating the harm posed by weapons in the possession of convicted felons. The judge, however, stated that he was required to impose a consecutive term. That is not the case. The trial judge may have recognized at various times during the trial that a consecutive term was optional rather than mandatory, but at sentencing, he expressly stated 'by statute it must be consecutive.' We, therefore, remand for reconsideration of this portion of Alford's sentence."

State v. Omar Bridges, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-0806-07T4 (September 8, 2010) - Convictions reversed.

Continue reading "NJ Court Finds Prosecutorial Misconduct " »

State v. Hector C. Morales, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-3968-08T4 (September 29, 2010) - Denial of PCR reversed, case remanded for evidentiary hearing. "As to defendant's ... claim with respect to the performance of his trial attorney, we agree with defendant that the trial court acted too swiftly in concluding that defendant was not entitled to post-conviction relief. Defendant asserted that at one point during the trial, the jury, which was in the hallway, saw him being transported in handcuffs. He contended in his petition that he told his attorney of this incident, and his attorney failed to pursue it before the trial court.... In our judgment, defendant was entitled to a hearing at which the credibility of his allegation could be measured by testimony offered under oath and tested through cross-examination. The trial court recognized that if the jury considering the question of defendant's guilt or innocence of the crimes charged did, in fact, see him being escorted in handcuffs, the likelihood of irremediable prejudice was great.... Here, during the course of the hearing on defendant's petition, the trial court expressed its view at several junctures that it did not believe defendant's assertion. To prevent the possibility of any taint flowing from those statements, we direct that this hearing be conducted by a trial judge other than the judge who initially heard defendant's petition for post-conviction relief."

State v. Anthony Hamlet, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-5414-07T4 (September 22, 2010) - Denial of PCR reversed, case remanded for evidentiary hearing. "In this case, the PCR court relied on defendant's 1977, 1983, and 1988 convictions in Indiana as predicate offenses to find defendant eligible for an extended term under New Jersey's Three Strikes law. However, the information the State provided to the trial court regarding defendant's prior criminal history in Indiana lacked detailed language, and defendant disputes his 1977 conviction....

[D]efendant argues his convictions in Indiana are not 'substantially equivalent' to a conviction for first-degree robbery in New Jersey. Under these circumstances, we conclude defendant has established a prima facie case and he is entitled to a hearing because there is a 'reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional conduct, the result of the [sentencing hearing] would have been different.' [Citations omitted]. Consequently, we reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether defendant was subject to a mandatory sentence under the Three Strikes law, and for resentencing because the sentencing court incorrectly imposed three extended-term sentences."