New Jersey Criminal Defense Attorney Blog

State v. Michael Coppola, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-0256-08T4 (September 7, 2010) - Convictions reversed.

Continue reading "NJ Judge Should Have Given "Justification" Defense to Jury " »

State v. Omar Bridges, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-0806-07T4 (September 8, 2010) - Convictions reversed.

Continue reading "Trial Judge Should Have Given Jury Identification Charge" »

Obstruction the Administration of Justice, or "Obstruction," or "Obstructing Justice" is a common quasi-criminal charge made by police in New Jersey. It is generally an NJ disorderly persons offense, which subjects the defendant to up to six months in jail and a $1,000 fine.

The applicable New Jersey statute is NJSA 2C:29-1, which provides: a. A person commits an offense if he purposely obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from lawfully performing an official function by means of flight, intimidation, force, violence, or physical interference or obstacle, or by means of any independently unlawful act. This section does not apply to failure to perform a legal duty other than an official duty, or any other means of avoiding compliance with law without affirmative interference with governmental functions.

b. An offense under this section is a crime of the fourth degree if the actor obstructs the detection or investigation of a crime or the prosecution of a person for a crime, otherwise it is a disorderly persons offense.

Police sometimes issue these charges without any sound legal or factual basis. Typically when you simply do (or fail to do) something they want you to do when you have every right to simply refuse. Common scenarios are when an individual declines to implicate his or herself or another in a crime. Remember, defendants have the right to remain silent! There is therefore usually a good defense available if you are charged with Obstructing the Administration of Justice in New Jersey.

State v. Darryl Bozeman, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-0565-06T4 (September 13, 2010) - Case remanded for evidentiary hearing.

Continue reading "Trial Judge Failed to Make Adequate Factual Findings" »

State v. P.T., ? N.J. Super. ?, 2010 N.J. Super. LEXIS 188 (September 10, 2010) - Order denying dismissal of indictment reversed, case remanded.

Continue reading "NJ Criminal Defense Attorney Has Indictment Dismissed on Appeal" »

State v. Stanford Yough, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-3832-07T4 (September 3, 2010) - Conviction reversed.

Continue reading "Witness Comments During Trial Result in Conviction Reversal" »

State v. Ziair T. McDaniels, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-0871-07T4 (September 8, 2010) - Conviction reversed.

Continue reading "NJ Drug Conviction Reversed for Insufficient Jury Instructions" »

State v. James J. Mauti, ? N.J. Super. ?, 2010 N.J. Super. LEXIS 187 (September 8, 2010) - "This appeal requires us to determine whether the spousal privilege in N.J.R.E. 501(2) can be pierced by applying the factors outlined by the Court in In re Kozlov, 79 N.J. 232, 243-44 (1979), used in that case to pierce the privilege afforded to communications between an attorney and his or her client. The trial court applied the Kozlov factors to compel the spouse of defendant James J. Mauti to testify as a witness for the State in this criminal action. We now reverse the trial court's ruling and hold that the factors identified by the Court in Kozlov are inapplicable to pierce the status privilege conferred by N.J.R.E. 501(2).... We discern no legal basis for disregarding the statute's clear mandate to preclude the spouse of an accused from testifying in a criminal action except to prove the fact of the marriage. The three statutory exceptions to this straightforward injunction are not applicable here. Equally absent are the competing constitutional interests that the Court in Kozlov found must be present to tip the scale in favor of piercing the privilege in the absence of a statutory exception. Even if, arguendo, we were to consider the concerns raised by the State to be of sufficient magnitude to render the spousal testimonial privilege subject to the three-prong test in Kozlov, we are satisfied that the privilege would prevail. Unquestionably the State can show that it has a legitimate need for Jeannette's testimony and that such testimony is both relevant and material to its case against defendant, thus satisfying prongs one and two under Kozlov. We are not convinced, however, that the State has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that this information cannot 'be secured from any less intrusive source.' Kozlov, supra, 79 N.J. at 243-44."

State v. Dimas Humberto Flores-Alfaro, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-3969-08T4 (September 1, 2010) - Convictions reversed.

Continue reading "Sex Offense Conviction Reversed After Nurse Gives Expert Medical Testimony" »

State v. Michael Coppola, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-0256-08T4 (September 7, 2010) - Convictions reversed.

Continue reading "NJ Assault Conviction Reversed for Prejudicial Expert Testimony" »

State v. Frank G. Dellisanti, ? N.J. ?, 2010 N.J. LEXIS 914 (September 20, 2010) - Prior opinion reversing conviction (2010 N.J. LEXIS 387 (April 27, 2010)) withdrawn, conviction affirmed.

Continue reading "Defendant's Conviction Affirmed After He Submitted False Information in Appellate Brief" »

State v. Peter Triestman, ? N.J. Super. ?, 2010 N.J. Super. LEXIS 188 (September 10, 2010) - Order denying dismissal of indictment reversed, case remanded.

Continue reading "Trial Judge Must Abuse Discretion on Denying Motion to Dismiss Indictment " »

State v. Darryl Bozeman, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-0565-06T4 (September 13, 2010) - Case remanded for evidentiary hearing. "Defendant argues that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated when the trial court refused to allow defense counsel to cross-examine Terrell about two topics: a plea bargain that Terrell was negotiating with federal prosecutors, which would immunize him from prosecution in the federal courts, and the alleged fact that the bargain would allow him to serve his New Jersey sentence in a federal institution.... The State concedes that the trial court should have allowed defendant to question Terrell about the impact of serving his State sentence in federal custody, but asserts that the preclusion was harmless. We cannot presume, however, that despite the representation of the United States Attorney shortly before the trial about the absence of any cooperation agreement, that upon his return to federal custody in New York after he testified, he immediately had unrelated discussions with the United States Attorney and entered the agreement. It would be improper to speculate that it was pure coincidence that an agreement was executed with the United States Attorney about ten days after Terrell testified in this case and while this trial was just ending. Nor can we speculate about the timing and the impact the agreement may have had on Terrell's testimony in this case if he anticipated such an agreement might or could be entered, and that he would serve his New Jersey sentence in some federal facility which may well be more accommodating than the one in New Jersey. We therefore decline to consider the confrontation issue or make a harmless error analysis at this time, and remand the matter to develop a record on the impact of the prohibition of questioning about Terrell's service of his State sentence in federal custody and to determine whether it impacts on defendant's argument that he is entitled to a new trial."

State v. Robert Covington, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-2644-08T4 (July 23, 2010) - Denial of motion for transfer to drug program pursuant to R. 3:21-10(b)(1) reversed, case remanded for new hearing. "With respect to the only issue raised on appeal, we note that the record before us reveals no clear request by defendant for the assignment of counsel at any time during the proceedings we have recounted. Nevertheless, it seems clear that, at various points in the proceedings, the motion judge announced a sense that defendant and the process would be benefited if he were represented by counsel. In any event, at the time this matter was considered in the trial court, no express authorization existed for assigning counsel to a defendant moving for Rule 3:21-10 relief. Since then, effective September 1, 2009, the Rule has been amended to [provide for assignment of such cases to the Public Defender].... The McKinney [140 N.J. Super. 160 (App. Div. 1976)] requirements, while easily stated, can be circumstantially intricate to apply, as this case demonstrates. We take no issue with the motion judge's announced understanding of the standards governing applications of this type or with his statement outlining the scope of his discretion. We also respect the judge's articulated sense that both defendant and the process would be assisted if an attorney were available to counsel defendant, develop and refine the arguments to be advanced on his behalf, and bring to this conceptually and circumstantially complex matter the mature insights and arts of persuasion that the subject matter and defendant's particulars require."

State v. RC & WD, ? N.J. ?, 2010 N.J. LEXIS 694 (July 21, 2010) - Appellate Division order directing plenary hearings for defendants rejected for Drug Court affirmed in part, reversed in part.

Continue reading "NJ Defendant Loses Drug Court Appeal" »

State in the Interest of J.S., a Juvenile, ? N.J. ?, 2010 N.J. LEXIS 547 (July 8, 2010) - Order directing DYFS to provide sex offender treatment ordered for J.S. reversed. "As a minor, J.S. sexually assaulted his younger sister. However, he was twenty-one years old when the juvenile court entered an order adjudicating him a delinquent based on the conduct that had occurred years earlier. The court's order required the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS), an agency within the Department of Children and Families (DCF), to provide him with sex offender treatment, notwithstanding that neither J.S. nor his family previously had any involvement with DYFS. Although not a party to J.S.'s delinquency proceedings, DYFS sought reconsideration, and then appealed.... We find nothing out of the ordinary in the juvenile court's determination to exercise its discretion to order probation and to place that condition of probation on J.S. Placing J.S. on probation with such a condition was entirely within the court's authority under the Code, and we so hold under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(b)(3)'s express language authorizing the same. The court erred, however, in believing that the appropriate mechanism for effectuating that disposition was N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(b)(5).... Here it seems apparent that the juvenile court's authority to refer juveniles to the care and responsibility of DCF must be conditioned on DCF's ability to provide services to the individual referred.... We are loathe to presume that by the language of N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(b)(5) the Legislature meant to expand, sub silentio, DCF's statutory powers and responsibilities to persons over the age of eighteen beyond the Legislature's express decree for DCF and DYFS.... Here it is clear that because DYFS, as the unit within DCF that was the focus of the court's order, was not assigned responsibility for adults like J.S., aged twenty-one, who had never before had a connection with the agency, the juvenile court erred in ordering DYFS to accept responsibility for sex offender treatment for J.S. That conclusion is based on the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(b)(5) and does not evidence a conflict between the Code and the statutes governing DYFS's statutory responsibilities.... The two can and do work together, however, that working together can result in DYFS simply not being the correct vehicle for effectuating a disposition. That said, as previously noted, the juvenile court was not without power to order the disposition of probation with the condition of sex offender treatment for J.S. That disposition was available through N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-43(b)(3) and if J.S. did not have the resources, or access to resources, to pay for the treatment, the expense would fall to the county."

State v. Donald Wright, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-0896-08T4 (July 14, 2010) - Convictions reversed, suppression ordered. "It is clear from Krissinger's own testimony that his initial encounter with Wright was not a field inquiry. Based on his observations of Wright sitting on a bench that had a graffito on it and acting nervously, Krissinger formed the belief that Wright had committed an act of criminal mischief, approached him, told him he was investigating the graffito, and asked Wright if he had written it. The 'accusatory nature' of that initial encounter is inconsistent with the encounter being a field inquiry.... Krissinger's intent to investigate Wright's perceived criminal activity and the accusatory nature of his questioning was also inconsistent with a characterization of the encounter as an exercise in 'community caretaking,' State v. Bogan, 200 N.J. 61, 73 (2009), which is how the motion judge described it.... Because Krissinger's initial encounter with Wright was neither a field inquiry nor an exercise in community caretaking, we must next determine whether the facts justified Krissinger in making an investigatory stop under Terry.... Our review of the record convinces us that, under the totality of the circumstances, the State has failed to demonstrate a reasonable and articulable suspicion to support Krissinger's investigative detention of Wright.... Even taking Krissinger's expertise as a special police officer into account, we simply fail to see how those facts, viewed objectively, could give rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Wright had engaged in an act of criminal mischief.... Because we conclude that Krissinger lacked the reasonable and articulable suspicion required for a Terry stop, we hold that he violated Wright's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure ... and that the stop was, consequently, unconstitutional.... Krissinger's seizure of the plastic bag was virtually simultaneous with his unconstitutional seizure of Wright.... Although Wright might have been subject to prosecution for obstruction in hitting the papers out of Krissinger's hands and running away, we find that those actions were not "intervening circumstances" that would remove the taint from Krissinger's preceding unconstitutional seizure of both Wright and the plastic bag."

State v. Ender F. Pompa, ? N.J. Super. ?, 2010 N.J. Super. LEXIS 114 (July 2, 2010) - Conviction reversed, case remanded for suppression of evidence and new trial. "Defendant was convicted of various drug offenses after more than thirty pounds of marijuana were seized from the sleeper cabin of his tractor trailer.... [T]he closely regulated business exception permitted a warrantless administrative inspection of certain areas of the tractor trailer, but the search turned unlawful when it progressed into unregulated areas without the exigent circumstances required by State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6, 28 (2009).... [T]he Trooper was entitled to conduct an administrative inspection of defendant's vehicle pursuant to applicable regulations and the purposes for which those regulations were adopted.... [T]he Level II inspection was permitted and authorized entry into the sleeper cabin since the federal regulations extend that far. However, the regulations do not encompass closets or personal belongings located inside a sleeper cabin and, as a result, the closely regulated business exception cannot form the basis for a warrantless search into those areas. Even if we assume Trooper Budrewicz entered the sleeper cabin for the purpose of conducting a safety check, ... , the search inside the cabin's closet and the opening of the baggage within that closet exceeded the letter and intent of the regulations applicable to sleeper cabins. In short, the search of the cabin's closet exceeded 'the spatial scope' of the administrative inspection.... In deferring to the trial judge's finding that the Trooper was able to smell raw marijuana in the sleeper cabin, we agree probable cause existed to search further into the sleeper cabin. However, in applying the requirements of Pena-Flores, mere proof of an unexpected vehicle stop and probable cause did not permit a warrantless search beyond the limits of the administrative inspection in the absence of exigent circumstances. As a result, the evidence seized from the closet in the vehicle's cabin and the additional evidence seized without a warrant thereafter could not be lawfully used against defendant at trial."

State v. Alice O'Donnell, ? N.J. ?, 2010 N.J. LEXIS 656 (July 20, 2010) - Judgment of Appellate Division affirming denial of suppression (408 N.J. Super. 177 (App. Div. 2009)) affirmed o.b.

"Stripped to its bare bones, the question presented is whether the police are allowed to remain at a murder site after a proper entry under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement, thereby authorizing the lawful seizure of evidence in plain view. Subject to the limitations expressed both by the Appellate Division and below, the answer to that question is 'yes.'...

The reasonableness of continuous police presence at the location initially accessed under the emergency aid exception is defined by the facts presented.... In this case, where the police gained access and seized evidence without a warrant, the propriety of the access indisputably was established by the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement; the continued police presence at the site of the dead body of a six-year-old child was authorized until the scene could be turned over to the medical examiner without a break in custody; and the seizure of evidence of a crime was authorized by the plain view doctrine.

In respect of the discrete issue presented in this appeal -- whether it was proper for the police to remain on the premises and seize evidence after discovery of the dead body abated the initial emergency -- the conclusion is, to us, clear: because the corpse remained at what was obviously the death scene and the police had the obligation to retain control of the premises until that control could be transferred to the medical examiner, the police had a continuing right to remain present at the scene."

In this recent criminal appeal, the NJ Supreme Court set a bright-line rule on when so-called "protective sweeps" are justified.

State v. Johnnie Davila, ? N.J. ?, 2010 N.J. LEXIS 590 (July 14, 2010) - Denial of suppression reversed, case remanded for further proceedings on propriety of protective sweep. "[A]lthough we hold that the absence of probable cause to arrest does not render a protective sweep per se illegal, we acknowledge that it would be too facile to permit a protective sweep whenever officers are lawfully within a premises. There is simply too great a potential for the pretextual use of otherwise lawful police presence as an opportunity to conduct a warrantless raid of a home cloaked as a protective sweep; so broad an exception would swallow whole the protections of the warrant requirement. Those concerns are particularly relevant where, as in this case, the lawfulness of the police entry is based on the consent of an occupant.... We hold that a protective sweep of a home may only occur when (1) law enforcement officers are lawfully within the private premises for a legitimate purpose, which may include consent to enter; and (2) the officers on the scene have a reasonable articulable suspicion that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger. Where those substantive conditions are met, as a matter of procedure, the sweep will be upheld only if (1) it is cursory, and (2) it is limited in scope to locations in which an individual could be concealed.... The search should be strictly limited in duration to the time frame during which police are lawfully within the premises.... The law enforcement officers cannot have created the danger to which they became exposed by entering the premises, and thereby bootstrap into an entitlement to perform a protective sweep.... In the present matter, ..., we are satisfied that there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that the officers entered the apartment due to the consent of Jayaad Brown. However, questions remain concerning the legitimacy of the investigative technique employed. On remand we direct the trial court to consider specifically whether the knock-and-talk technique employed by the officers was a pretext to gain access to the apartment to conduct an unconstitutional search, and not to speak to the occupants. We have serious reservations arising from our disagreement with the court's observation that the officers possessed articulable suspicion to justify the search of the apartment...."

State v. Eugene Basil, ? N.J. ?, 2010 N.J. LEXIS 657 (July 22, 2010) - Reversal of conviction affirmed by evenly divided Court, but suppression of evidence reversed. "Officer Ruocco ... testified that he responded to 199 Bidwell Avenue based on a dispatcher's report of a man with a shotgun. On his arrival at the scene, he was approached by a young black woman, who had come from around the corner. She told the officer that defendant, who was standing nearby, had pointed a shotgun at her, that he had told her and the group she was with to 'get off the corner,' and that he had thrown the shotgun underneath a black Cadillac. The young woman was an identifiable citizen and purported to give information from her personal knowledge regarding events that occurred minutes earlier. This was a face-to-face encounter that allowed the officer to make an on-the-spot credibility assessment of the citizen informant. Importantly, the young woman's reliability was immediately corroborated by the discovery of the shotgun in the precise location where she said it was discarded.... That the young woman would later refuse to give any identifying data about herself out of an expressed fear for her safety does little to diminish the reliability of the information when it was given.... From the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, the combination of an identifiable citizen's account of events that she witnessed firsthand minutes earlier and the discovery of corroborative physical evidence -- the shotgun with which she was purportedly threatened -- in the location she described provided probable cause to arrest defendant."