New Jersey Criminal Defense Attorney Blog

Englishtown Borough Municipal Court

Location: 15 Main Street
Englishtown, NJ 07726

Phone: (732) 446-4457
Fax: (732) 446-4979
Email: court@englishtownnj.com

The judge is the Honorable James M. Newman, J.M.C. The prosecutor is Richard Kelly, Esq. The Court Administrator is Rosemary O'Donnell. Sessions are held on the first and third Wednesdays at 5:00 p.m. Almost the entire Borough of Englishtown is a 25-mile per hour speed zone. This results in Englishtown police issuing a large amount of speeding tickets, as well as a good deal of DWIs.

Howell Township Municipal Court

Location: 300 Old Tavern Rd.
Howell Township, NJ 07731

Mailing Address: Howell Township Court
P.O. Box 580
Howell, NJ 07731

Phone: (732) 938-4848
Fax: (732) 938-7054

The Judge is the Honorable Allen S. Kaplan, J.M.C. The prosecutor is John Rihacek, Esq. and Sean Keane, Esq. The court administrator is Elizabeth McGee. Howell has become one of the busiest municipal courts in Monmouth County. Night sessions at the court can be overwhelming, with a multi-hour waiting line to speak with the prosecutor. Howell Township Police as well as State Police issue a heavy amount of speeding tickets and other traffic tickets in Howell. A large amount of DWI and minor criminal arrests are also made in Howell.

Millstone Township Municipal Court

Location: 215 Millstone Road
Millstone Twp., NJ 08510

Phone: (732) 446-6219
Fax: (732) 446-4853

The judge in Millstone Courts is the Honorable Francis F.X. Foley, J.M.C. The prosecutor is Richard Kelly, Esq. The Court Administrator is Diane Canzanella, CMCA. Millstone Township does not have its own police department. The New Jersey State Police have jurisdiction over the area and issue a large amount of speeding and other traffic tickets. Also a fair amount of minor drug possession arrests resulting from car searches.

Jackson Township Municipal Court
Location: 102 Jackson Dr.
Jackson, NJ 08527
Phone: (732) 928-1205
Fax: (732) 928-4377

The judge is the Honorable Daniel Sahin, J.M.C. The prosecutor is Joseph Coronato, Esq. The court administrator is Erin Decristina. Jackson police write up a heavy amount of summons for speeding, reckless driving and DWI.

Freehold Township Municipal Court
Location: One Municipal Plaza
Freehold, NJ 07728
Phone: (732) 294-2000
Fax: (732) 462-7910

Court Sessions are Tuesdays at 8:00 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. Wednesdays at 8:00 a.m. and 1:30 p.m.

The judge is the Honorable Thomas F.X. Foley, J.M.C. The prosecutor is Nicole Sonnenblick, Esq. Freehold Township sees a lot of traffic tickets from Rts 9 and 33 and a good deal of Shoplifting cases from the Freehold Raceway Mall, Walmart and other stores. Anthony J. Vecchio frequently appears in Freehold Twp. Municipal Court to defend clients charged with DWI, Shoplifting, Drug Possession, and traffic tickets.

Marlboro Township Municipal Court
Location: 1979 Township Drive
Marlboro, NJ 07746
Phone: (732) 536-0200
Fax: (732) 591-0608

Court Sessions: Wednesdays - 8:30 a.m. & 3:30 p.m.

The Judge was formerly Richard Gantner, who was recently replaced with the Honorable James M. Newman, J.M.C. The prosecutor was Patrick Sheehy, who was recently replaced with Alan Faulk. Irene Moore is the Court Administrator.

Marlboro sees a good deal of moving violations, especially speeding and improper passing on Rtes. 9 and 18. Also a fair share of minor drug offenses such as possession of marijuana. Anthony J. Vecchio, Esq. frequently appears on behalf of clients in this court.

Manalapan Township Municipal Court
Address: 120 Route 522 & Taylor's Mills Road, Manalapan NJ 07726
Phone: (732) 446-6656
Fax: (732) 446-2504
Hours: M - F 8:30 to 4:00

The Judge is the Honorable James M. Newman, J.M.C.
The Prosecutor is Nicole Sonnenblick, Esq.
The Court Administrator is Daniella M. Trancho

Court sessions are every Monday 9:00 AM for Arraignments for 9:30 AM for Not guilty pleas and 1:00 PM for all attorney matters. Manalapan police issue a large amount of speeding ticket, some in "target enforcement areas" which mandate a court appearance as well as some DWI's, tailgating/following too close and other traffic tickets.

In this recent NJ criminal appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the defendant's conviction after finding that the trial judge improperly questioned the defendant's witnesses. This gave the jury the impression that the judge doubted the witnesses' credibility.

State v. Peter J. O'Brien, ? N.J. ?, 2009 N.J. LEXIS ? (December 29, 2009) - Conviction reversed because the trial court's questioning of defendant and other witnesses ran afoul of State v. Taffaro, 195 N.J. 442, 451 (2008). "At trial, defendant did not contest the fact he killed his parents; his sole defense was diminished capacity, which was to be proved through his testimony about his drug consumption and depression, and that of his expert psychiatrist. During the trial, the trial judge injected himself into the case by questioning witnesses, including defendant and his expert. Because that questioning made it seem as though the judge did not credit the proffered defense, it denied defendant a fair trial.... [A] judge has a right to question witnesses in a criminal trial. But that right is tethered to ensuring the fairness of the proceedings, to expedition, and to the clarification of ambiguities. None of those matters was at issue here. Here, the judge's questioning was gratuitous and evidenced incredulity with respect to defendant's only defense, along with support for the State's witness. As in [State v. Guido, 40 N.J. 191, 208 (1963)], the 'judge's repeated assurances to the jury that he was acting in the interest of justice with no purpose of aiding or hurting the prosecution or the defense' rang hollow and were not sufficient to cure the harm...." See also JURY INSTRUCTIONS. (Jay L. Wilensky, A.D.P.D.)
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/supreme/A-89-08.pdf

In this NJ criminal appeal, the defendant was able to convince the Appellate Division to reverse his conviction by arguing that the trial judge should have continued his trial to allow his witness to testify.

State v. Derek A. Clark, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-1083-08T4 (December 2, 2009) - Conviction reversed. "Defendant testified that four days before the police executed the warrant for the search of his home, a friend of his named Antwan Allison came to his house and told him he needed to put some items in defendant's safe while he went to visit his wife in the hospital....

We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's application for a one-day continuance of the trial to afford defendant an opportunity to produce Allison as a defense witness, and that defendant made a sufficient showing of prejudice as a result of that denial to require a reversal of his conviction and a retrial....

[D]efense counsel stated at a pretrial conference that the prosecutor's office had taken a video statement from Allison, and the assistant prosecutor did not dispute that Allison's testimony would be supportive of the defense. Under all these circumstances, the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to grant a one-day continuance of the trial until Monday or even to explore the feasibility of such a continuance or other steps that would have enabled defendant to call Allison as a witness." (John W. Hartmann)
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a1083-08.pdf

In this recent NJ DWI appeal, the appeals court found that the 344 day delay of the defendant's trial violated his right to a speedy trial.

State v. Christos E. Tsetsekas, ? N.J. Super. ?, 2009 N.J. Super. LEXIS 253 (December 14, 2009) - NJ DWI conviction reversed.

"Under the facts of this case, we conclude the extensive delay in adjudicating this matter, caused by the State's repeated lapses in preparation, infringed upon defendant's due process rights such that his conviction must be reversed and the charge dismissed....

Here, the 344 day dispositional period is more than five times the [ordinary 60-day guideline for DWI cases], and ... the delays were numerous, mostly avoidable and largely unexplained.... The weight of the delay resulting from the reoccurring unavailability of the State Troopers, despite information that their appearance was required, falls on the shoulders of the prosecutor.

The State must be responsible to produce its witnesses when trial is called. We also consider significant the fact that the State did not discover its witnesses' unavailability until the trial date, rather than securing their appearance ahead of time....

The repeated delays and unnecessary appearances due to the State's ill-preparedness, which caused disruption of defendant's everyday activities, the consumption of time and money, and emotional anxiety and uncertainty, add up to more than 'minimal' prejudice to defendant." (Thomas S. Doerr)
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a1832-08.pdf

State v. Dana Rone, ? N.J. Super. ?, 2009 N.J. Super. LEXIS 250 (December 9, 2009) - Conviction for obstruction of justice and forfeiture of public office affirmed. "The first question, analytically, is whether defendant's conviction ... touched on her position as a member of the City Council....

Defendant stresses that the record does not contain any findings of dishonesty or untrustworthiness on her part; this, she contends, demonstrates that her actions on the night in question do not touch on her office.

This, however, is not the test enunciated by the McCann [167 N.J. 311 (2001)] Court; an offense touches on an individual's office if it flows from that office.... Here, ... , defendant repeatedly announced her public position and pointed to her use of a municipal vehicle.

She used her position to denigrate the university's police force, and dissatisfied with the manner in which the university police were responding to her, summoned what she termed the 'real' police, the City's municipal police. We agree with the trial court that defendant's offense did indeed touch on her position as a member of the city council."

With regard to possible waiver of forfeiture under N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(e), "We are satisfied that defendant's threshold analysis, that is, that the critical question is whether good cause exists to waive forfeiture, is correct and that the State's position, that the prosecutor's decision to seek waiver is entitled to enhanced deference, is incorrect. That defendant applies the correct analytical framework does not advance her cause, however, for we are equally satisfied that good cause was not demonstrated." (Patricia Bombelyn)
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a5850-07a6192-07.pdf

In this recent NJ Criminal Appeal, the defense attorney successfully argued that a police search of a vehicle's glove box was illegal.

State v. Ricardo Manuel Ortiz and Arnaldo A. Ortiz, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-4026-08T4 (December 28, 2009) - Suppression of evidence affirmed. Although the stop of the vehicle for having too-darkly tinted windows was justified, and the smell of unburned marijuana gave the police "a well-grounded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot," "we conclude that sufficient credible evidence in the record supports the motion judge's finding that the police lacked exigency to search the glove compartment without first obtaining a warrant, either by telephone or in person....

[A]t all times, the occupants of the SUV complied with police directions, including moving their vehicle some distance from the scene. There was no indication they knew Arnaldo's vehicle contained CDS, nor was any CDS in plain view. Far from presenting any threat to the officers' safety or preservation of the evidence, one of the SUV occupants, a relative of defendants, was actually given the keys to Arnaldo's Honda to take possession of the vehicle upon the defendants' transport to jail....

Equally lacking is any indication that any delay occasioned by obtaining a warrant to search the car would have jeopardized either the officers' safety or the integrity of the evidence.... Koeppen, upon opening the glove compartment and observing the bag, did not believe the bag contained a weapon of any kind. Even if Koeppen lawfully opened the glove compartment, there would have been no justification under the State's theory for further searching the plastic bag, which did not appear on its exterior to contain any weapon therein....

Here, to avoid suppression as fruit of the poisonous automobile search, the State had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the cocaine in Ricardo's shoe and sock would have inevitably been discovered as a result of a search incident to a lawful warrant or an inventory search prefatory to his incarceration on that charge. Yet the State has offered no evidence -- much less clear and convincing proof -- of the circumstances attending Ricardo's stationhouse search....

Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that Ricardo would have been lawfully confined to a municipal or county detention facility, that he would not otherwise have been released on his own recognizance, or have posted bail if, in fact, bail had been set on the warrant charge. To the contrary, the record is silent even as to the underlying charge on which Ricardo's outstanding warrant was based." (Marc E. Lieberman)
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a4026-08.pdf

In this recent NJ criminal appeal, the defendant lost while arguing that the standard for probable cause to arrest is a separate inquiry than that for probable cause to search.

State v. Richard Chippero, ? N.J. ?, 2009 N.J. LEXIS ? (December 29, 2009) - Suppression of evidence reversed, case remanded to Appellate Division for consideration of other issues. The opinion in State v. Chippero (I), 164 N.J. 3432 (2000), holding that defendant's confession had to be suppressed because it was the product of an arrest not supported by probable cause, could not fairly be read to hold that there was no probable cause for the separate search of defendant's home.

"We join those many courts in recognizing that probable cause to arrest and probable cause to search involve distinct and not necessarily identical inquiries. A finding of probable cause as to one does not mean that probable cause as to the other must follow, nor does the lack of one compel a finding that there is a lack of support for the other....

[A] court may find a lack of probable cause to arrest an individual and yet determine that probable cause exists to search the home where that individual resides." In this case, there was probable cause for the search of the home because "Judge Figarotta was told that a disinterested person saw someone, within minutes of the estimated time of the homicide, run from the vicinity of the front area of the victim's home to the premises at 49 Poe Road and enter it.

The person appeared sweaty, his clothing appearing wet and sticking to him as if from some sort of exertion. He appeared anxious to get out of his shirt, pulling at it to get it off of him as he entered the home. We know that the murder scene showed that the rape and stabbing of the victim required a not inconsiderable effort and that much blood was spilled.... We conclude that the issuing judge could have found from the record recited above that a reasonable probability existed to show that the person McMenemy saw may have had a connection with the crime and may have had on him, or on his clothing, evidence connected to the sexual assault and murder." (Alison S. Perrone, Designated Counsel)
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/supreme/A-50-08.pdf

The NJ criminal defendant in this case was able to win on appeal by arguing that the trial judge erred in handling a question from the jury on accomplice liability.

State v. Timothy Glenn Watts, unpublished opinion, App. Div. Docket No. A-4331-06T4 (December 4, 2009) - First degree robbery conviction reversed. "the State prosecuted Watts solely on an accomplice liability theory, contending that he willingly participated in the crime with Caldwell and that he shared a common purpose and intent with Caldwell to commit an armed robbery against Singh....

However, the State alternatively took the position that, even if Watts did not learn that Caldwell committed this armed robbery until Caldwell returned to the car with the money, by driving Caldwell away from the scene, he could have formed the requisite intent and purpose at that time to make him an accomplice to the armed robbery.... Over defense counsel's objection, the judge answered ... 'yes' to [the question, '[c]an the purpose become apparent at any point of the robbery?']....

The judge's answer to the jurors' questions allowed the jurors to find Watts guilty as an accomplice of armed robbery based upon a finding that Watts' participation in the crime did not begin until Caldwell returned to the car and Watts then first learned that Caldwell committed the robbery. For the reasons we have stated, and as more expansively stated in Whitaker, [402 N.J. Super. 495 (App. Div. 2008), affirmed ? N.J. ?, 2009 N.J. LEXIS (December 7, 2009)], we conclude that in those circumstances, any such conduct by Watts in driving the getaway car could not result in accomplice liability for the crime Caldwell committed by his own conduct. We accordingly reverse Watts' conviction and remand for a new trial on the armed robbery charge." (Michael Confusione, Designated Counsel)
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a4331-06a0552-07.pdf

The Appellate Division recently reversed the criminal conviction of this defendant after holding that the trial court should not have given the jury a charge on intoxication over the objection of defense counsel.

State v. R.T., ? N.J. Super. ?, 2009 N.J. Super. LEXIS 255 (December 17, 2009) - Convictions reversed, dissent by Judge Espinosa. "In this appeal we consider primarily whether defendant's right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the court charging the jury with intoxication as possibly negating an element of the crime, over defendant's objection. Finding error, we reverse and remand for a new trial....

In summation, the defense took the position that defendant did not commit the offenses and focused primarily on seeking to impugn the credibility of L.T. and his mother, including noting inconsistencies in the child's testimony and her conviction for child endangerment.

Counsel also commented generally on the problems inherent in the police interrogation that was only partially audiotaped and noted Hunsinger's suggestion to defendant that he was drunk.

An intoxication defense was not asserted explicitly or implicitly.... The facts of the present case do not clearly indicate a rational basis for the conclusion that defendant suffered from such a 'prostration of faculties' as to render him incapable of forming the requisite mental state to commit the crimes....

Not only did the facts not clearly indicate the appropriateness of the intoxication charge, but the instruction impermissibly interfered with defendant's chosen trial strategy as clearly articulated to the court during the charge conference. Our courts have expressed a general need to refrain from interfering with defense counsel's strategy." (Michael Confusione, Designated Counsel)
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a1131-06.pdf